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This Article analyzes a recent policy innovation offered by governments
on both sides of the Atlantic as a means of mitigating one form of national
security risk: the idea that private individuals and voluntary associations
have an untapped capacity for combating terrorism and in particular al
Qaeda. Bold assertions in recent strategy statements mooting this possibility
have wanted for any supporting account of how private behavior conduces to
security. Even if the claimed social production of security against terrorism is
causally well-founded, it is unclear how the state can elicit desirable private
conduct. Consequently, the proposal’s legal and policy ramifications remain
elusive. To begin to address these gaps, this Article develops a comprehensive
analysis of three plausible causal mechanisms that might yield the putative
security-related benefits of social action. I label these ideological competition,
ethical anchoring, and cooperative coproduction. Drawing on legal, economic, and social psychology scholarship to illuminate these three mechanisms, this Article further investigates the state’s role in eliciting potentially
desirable private action against terrorism risk. The Article concludes by highlighting threshold legal, strategic, and ethical puzzles in designing policies to
elicit counterterrorism’s social production—puzzles that to date have received
short shrift in American counterterrorism debates.
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INTRODUCTION
National security bears all the hallmarks of a quintessential public
good.1 Once provided, individuals cannot be excluded from its benefits. One person’s enjoyment also leaves the balance undiminished
for others. Susceptible to individuals’ free riding, private action is
likely to undersupply public goods such as national security. Hence,
government production would seem the best method to achieve its
supply. Indeed, the federal government has been the principal supplier of national security since the Republic’s founding. The framers
of the Constitution, moreover, understood security to be a central
charge of the newly empowered national government. But challenges
to public security morph over time. In the past decade, it has been in
large measure the threat to civilian life from al Qaeda, its affiliates,
and fellow travelers that has animated security policy. Concerns about
non-state-sponsored terrorism have spurred institutional transformations in government,2 new surveillance technologies,3 novel uses of
1
Cf. RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 17 (1982) (“Public goods are defined by
two properties: jointness of supply and impossibility of exclusion.” (emphasis omitted)).
2
See, e.g., Dara Kay Cohen et al., Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political
Design of Legal Mandates, 59 STAN. L. REV. 673, 678, 689–98 (2006) (documenting the creation of the Department of Homeland Security).
3
See generally Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional
Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407 (2012) (discussing the
evolution of and federal forays into new surveillance technologies).
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familiar policy tools,4 and controversial foreign military deployments.5
Mesmerized by these transformations, legal scholars have been drawn
ineluctably to the task of examining the state’s responses to terrorism,
including a seemingly inexorable engorgement of the national security state.6 Never, it seems, has the idea that the state must monopolize
responses to political violence seemed so compelling.
Yet even as new laws and practices erode the legal and institutional constraints of bygone times and the state undertakes previously
unimaginable forms of surveillance with devices that were science fiction a mere generation ago, a scintilla of doubt about the government’s proper role has emerged. Paradoxically, it was the state itself
that first planted that seed. Governments on both sides of the Atlantic
have started in recent years to suggest—tentatively, incompletely, and
in piecemeal fashion—that the provision of national security should
not be the monopoly of the state or its subcontractors.7 Mutations in
the threat from al Qaeda have stimulated rethinking of the production function for national security. As a result, both U.S. and U.K.
official policy documents from 2010 onward have identified a necessary role for informal nonstate actors—ranging from individuals to
private associations to families—in creating security against terrorism.
These policy statements boldly claim that nonstate actors are likely to
have a dispositive influence on both the scale of terrorism-related security threats and the effectiveness of state responses. Stated otherwise, they point toward the possibility of a social production of security
against terrorism.
One such policy statement is the White House’s May 2010 National Security Strategy. This document posited that among the “best
defenses against [the] threat [of terrorism within the United States]
are well informed and equipped families, local communities, and institutions.”8 In August 2011, the White House published a follow-on
4
See generally Aziz Z. Huq, The Political Path of Detention Policy, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1531 (2011) (narrating the development of new forms of detention power).
5
For excellent synoptic histories, see generally PETER L. BERGEN, THE LONGEST WAR:
THE ENDURING CONFLICT BETWEEN AMERICA AND AL-QAEDA (2011) (detailing the history of
the war on terrorism), and JASON BURKE, THE 9/11 WARS (2011) (same).
6
See, e.g., Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, A Hidden World, Growing Beyond Control,
WASH. POST, July 19, 2010, at A1 (documenting the fiscal and institutional growth of national security bureaucracy).
7
This suggestion is distinct from the claim that the military should have no monopoly on counterterrorism. Cf. J. Scott Carpenter et al., Confronting the Ideology of Radical Extremism, 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 301, 301, 303–05 (2009) (“[T]he U.S. government
has slowly come to realize that military force alone cannot defeat radical Islamist extremism . . . .”).
8
THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 19 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY], available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_
viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf; see also THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM 6 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY],
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policy paper entitled Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, in which it reiterated that combating terrorism
“is not the work of government alone.”9 Three months later, the Executive issued yet another related paper, this time a “Strategic Implementation Plan,” with the professed aim of fostering increased
nongovernmental participation in the production of security.10 Nor is
U.S. policy exceptional: British policy documents trace a similar path.
The U.K.’s 2011 counterterrorism strategy, called “Contest,” underscores that “faith institutions and organisations can play a very important role in preventative activity.”11 In this fashion, both the American
and British governments have asserted that there is necessary space
for the social production of security against al Qaeda,12 even as both
governments maintain the need for a dominant state role in respect to
other security risks.13 Moreover, this social production is something
more than universal vigilance (as conveyed by the familiar slogan of
“see something, say something”) and private contractors hiving off the
state’s tasks. Nor is it the same as private engagement in other historical contexts, like private aid for the Continental Army or private collaboration with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) through the
Cold War. What the U.S. and U.K. governments propose is something
distinct and new for the post-9/11 era.
The notion that security against terrorism demands private as
well as state action may have diffused across national boundaries and
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_strategy.pdf
(stressing the importance of “community resilience programs”).
9
THE WHITE HOUSE, EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM
IN THE UNITED STATES, at i (2011) [hereinafter 2011 EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf.
10
THE WHITE HOUSE, STRATEGIC IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS TO PREVENT VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES 1–2 (2011) [hereinafter 2011
SIP], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/sip-final.pdf.
11
SEC’Y OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEP’T, CONTEST: THE UNITED KINGDOM’S STRATEGY
FOR COUNTERING TERRORISM, Cm. 8123, at 68 (2011) [hereinafter CONTEST: U.K.’S STRATEGY], available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/counterterrorism-strategy/strategy-contest?view=Binary. For a reiteration of the same claim, see
SEC’Y OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEP’T, PREVENT STRATEGY, Cm. 8092, at 24–25 (U.K. 2011)
[hereinafter PREVENT STRATEGY], available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/
counter-terrorism/prevent/prevent-strategy/prevent-strategy-review?view=Binary. The focus on community production of security is not a new feature of British counterterrorism
thinking. See HER MAJESTY’S (HM) GOV’T, THE PREVENT STRATEGY: A GUIDE FOR LOCAL
PARTNERS IN ENGLAND 6 (2008) [hereinafter PREVENT GUIDE], available at https://www.
education.gov.uk/publications/eOrderingDownload/Prevent_Strategy.pdf (emphasizing
the need to “increas[e] the resilience of communities” so they can help fight “violent
extremism”).
12
For a similar use of the term “social production,” see Kirk R. Williams & Robert L.
Flewelling, The Social Production of Criminal Homicide: A Comparative Study of Disaggregated
Rates in American Cities, 53 AM. SOC. REV. 421, 426–27 (1988).
13
See, e.g., 2010 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 8, at 24–26 (discussing foreign policy in respect to Mideast states).
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between jurisdictions, but it has not yet developed robust theoretical
or evidentiary foundations. To date, official assertions about the need
for social inputs into counterterrorism strategy have lacked stable
anchoring in a general account of how social forces mitigate, or even
increase, the risk of terrorism. It is not clear, for example, precisely
what behaviors are socially desirable on national security grounds or
under what circumstances they are likely to conduce to supplemental
security. Nor is it clear if there are mechanisms that the state might
have at hand through which it could influence the frequency or intensity of such desirable behaviors. As a result, there is no clear sense of
the empirical questions that must be resolved in order to establish
whether cultivating the social production of security against terrorism
is worthwhile. The scholarly literature to date has yet to pick up the
slack. With a handful of exceptions, scholarship remains largely concentrated on the state as the monopolistic producer of national security, addressing the legality or wisdom of policies without providing a
general account of potentially complementary social action.14
This Article starts to fill those gaps. It aims to identify potential
causal mechanisms of the social production of counterterrorism and
to explore legal and policy implications.15 Its first contribution is an
investigation of mechanisms that could potentially facilitate counterterrorism’s social production (i.e., the “set[s] of interrelated causal propositions” that link certain predicate facts to certain observed
effects).16 I isolate three such possible causal mechanisms. I label
these ideological competition, ethical anchoring, and cooperative coproduction. In harmony with the Article’s focus, each posited mechanism
comprises only “social action” (i.e., private, “consciously intended behavior”).17 Core cases of the latter involve private behavior not directed or catalyzed by a government actor.18 Social action
nonetheless also includes action that results in contact with officials
(e.g., reporting threat information) but excludes state-sponsored ac-

14
For one exception, see generally CHARLES KURZMAN, THE MISSING MARTYRS: WHY
THERE ARE SO FEW MUSLIM TERRORISTS (2011) (discussing the increase in national security
and covert operations after 9/11).
15
The central focus of this Article is al Qaeda–related terrorism, in line with the
current preoccupations of counterterrorism policy, although many of the arguments developed here may have applications to other forms of political extremism that precipitate
terrorist violence. Despite this potential applicability, the Article’s discussion of “terrorism” is with an al Qaeda focus in mind. Further, references to “national security” should
be understood in a parallel sense. I do not advance any claim that private action is salient
to, say, minimizing the threat of Chinese military action or the like.
16
JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: MORE NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 17 (2007).
17
JOHN LEVI MARTIN, SOCIAL STRUCTURES 9 (2009).
18
See infra Part II.
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tivities (e.g., serving as an informant).19 Exploring each mechanism, I
take pains to identify both arguments supporting the mechanism’s
existence and also reasons to doubt its efficacy. My aim is not to resolve the fundamentally empirical question of whether counterterrorism’s social production is ultimately substantial, but rather to specify
more precisely the conditions under which the social production of
security would emerge.
This Article’s second contribution is an analysis of how the state
might best elicit hypothetically desirable private behavior. Because
empirical evidence and theory on national security policy is fragmentary, it is necessary to draw on exogenous bodies of work in law and
the social sciences. Specifically, I borrow insights from deterrence
and legitimacy theories of the criminal law about how the state elicits
private action as lenses to illuminate core empirical, legal, and ethical
questions the social production of national security raises.20 I consider ethical concerns because governments presently perceive certain
“suspect communities,” typically defined by faith or ethnicity, both as
linked to terrorism and also as privileged social producers of
counterterrorism. This dual perspective can yield confused and inconsistent policies.21 Reflecting this internally contradictory approach, attempts to exploit the social production of security against
terrorism can end up at war with other post-9/11 doctrinal and institutional innovations. One output of this Article’s analysis, therefore,
is the identification of potential contradictions in current policy
portfolios.
A threshold caveat is warranted. The narrow aim of this Article is
to investigate conditions under which, as the U.S. and U.K. governments claim, social action mitigates terrorism risk. I offer no definitive conclusion about the existence or magnitude vel non of any of the
underlying mechanisms discussed, each of which rests on empirical
foundations that this Article can only partially elucidate.22 Legal
19
I also exclude the role of private actors as subcontractors. For a careful analysis of
that issue, see generally Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-Public Intelligence
Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901 (2008) (documenting the rise of
private-public partnerships in the national security domain and proposing new regulatory
frameworks).
20
See infra Part III.A–B.
21
Cf. MARY J. HICKMAN ET AL., LONDON METRO. UNIV., ‘SUSPECT COMMUNITIES’?
COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY, THE PRESS, AND THE IMPACT ON IRISH AND MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN BRITAIN 14 (2011), available at http://www.city.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/
96287/suspect-communities-report-july2011.pdf (noting the “ambiguous position of Irish
and Muslims—as victims, partners and threats”). The term “suspect communities” was not
coined by Hickman et al., but first appeared in PADDY HILLYARD, SUSPECT COMMUNITY: PEOPLE’S EXPERIENCE OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM ACTS IN BRITAIN (1993).
22
To see why modest aspirations are appropriate, it is useful to look at the literature
on crime control. In that far more extensively tilled field, sophisticated empirical analysis
employed over several generations of scholarship has yielded only partial and controversial
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scholarship commonly runs beyond the writ of available evidence, a
serious mistake that I hope to avoid.23 To that end, I take care to
develop arguments both for and against the existence of counterterrorism’s social production, as well as attending to the possibility that
some mechanisms may have perverse effects or may work at cross-purposes to other interventions. As a result, the most important product
of the following analysis is a general framework for the evaluation of
claims about the social production of counterterrorism. My hope is
that the framework enables ongoing evaluation of such claims based
on existing and yet-to-emerge evidence. Hence, even if I read the
available evidence to support the U.S. and U.K. governments’ claim—
as I tentatively do—that inference is not integral to the analysis.
This Article is organized into three Parts. Part I introduces the
(concededly familiar) problem of security against terrorism, the recent arc of al Qaeda’s evolution, and what might be termed the “social
turn” in official counterterrorism doctrine. Having established some
threshold reasons for taking that social turn seriously, Part II develops
an account of the potential causal mechanisms whereby social action
might generate national security. My aim is to lend the U.S. and U.K.
governments’ claims facial credibility, yet also to supply analytic tools
for more careful judgment on the merits. Part III then proceeds on
the assumption that social action does produce some security against
terrorism and inquires into how the state might elicit desirable forms
of private behavior. I thus do not intend to elaborate a definitive policy framework, but instead endeavor to provide a platform for deeper
reflection on an important and hitherto underappreciated and undertheorized dimension of counterterrorism law and policy.
I
CANONICAL ACCOUNTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY AS A PUBLIC
GOOD (AND THE LIMITS OF THESE ACCOUNTS)
This Part provides analytic and historical grounding for the inquiry into the causal foundations of national security’s social production. It begins by developing the canonical view of national security as
a public good and shows how this view seemed to obtain confirmation
from post-9/11 U.S. policy changes. Counterterrorism, however, is a
dynamic game. Enemies evolve instead of hewing to older, vulnerable
forms of terrorism. Al Qaeda has certainly developed and adapted in
response to American policy initiatives. Its developmental path, however, has indirectly engendered challenges to the conventional view
causal accounts of rises and declines in crime. See, e.g., FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT
AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 195–209 (2007). There is little reason to expect our accounts of
how to mitigate terrorism to be much more sophisticated.
23
I am grateful to Steve Schulhofer for discussions on this point.
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that the state has a monopoly on the production of security. Emergent official emphasis on counterterrorism’s social inputs, as described in a final section of this Part, is best understood as a response
to this terrorist-threat evolution.
A. Counterterrorism as a Public Good
A public good is one that is both nonexcludable and nonrivalrous
in nature, in the sense that individuals cannot be effectively excluded
from its use and one individual’s use does not exhaust the good’s
availability for others.24 Public goods that have value for all or many
members of society are vulnerable to decomposition under the burden of free riding: the inability of contributing members to exclude
noncontributing members (who still reap benefits) will conduce to
suboptimal levels of production.25 The existence of underproduced
public goods provides an axiomatic justification for state involvement.26 By coercing contributions in the form of taxes or labor, centralized government ensures the provision of those public goods
undersupplied through private action.27 This justification has
resonance in U.S. history: the 1787 Constitution has been glossed recently by some public law scholars as a successful solution to perceived
collective action problems among the several states that induced, inter
alia, an underproduction of national security.28
National security has long been understood to be a quintessential
public good, one that is uniquely tailored to state monopolization.29
Indeed, the need for first collective, and then national, security was a
significant motivation for the U.S. Constitution’s drafters. The former
colonies’ failure to act decisively in the face of threatening infringements by European powers on their interests had forcefully struck
James Madison and his allies.30 In the summer of 1787, the drafters
24

See HARDIN, supra note 1, at 17.
See id. at 20 (“[T]he rational incentive to an individual in a latent group is not to
contribute to the group’s provision of its collective good to itself.” (emphasis omitted)).
Hardin attributes this point to MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 49–51 (1965).
26
See OLSON, supra note 25, at 15 (“A state is first of all an organization that provides
public goods for its members, the citizens . . . .”).
27
Cf. HARDIN, supra note 1, at 25–30 (arguing the logic underlying the free-riding
problem is one of an “n-person” prisoner’s dilemma).
28
See Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of
Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV. 115, 117–18 (2010).
29
OLSON, supra note 25, at 14 (“It would obviously not be feasible, if indeed it were
possible, to deny the protection provided by the military services . . . to those who did not
voluntarily pay their share of the costs of government . . . .”).
30
See PETER ONUF & NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD: THE LAW OF
NATIONS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTIONS, 1776–1814, at 93–122 (1993) (“The move toward
federal union followed from the failure of confederal arrangements to guarantee harmony
among the states and Congress’s resulting inability to conduct foreign policy.”).

R

25
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R
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remained deeply concerned by persistent violations of the law of nations “in some one or other of the States” that threatened to precipitate an international incident.31 These tendencies toward dangerous
conflicts were hazardously coupled in the Articles of Confederation
with the national government’s “inability to present a credible threat
of force.”32 To remedy this perilous situation, Articles I and II of the
new Constitution articulated new national powers to provide for the
common defense, and these constitutional authorities have been amply employed and expanded since ratification.33
The emergence of newly pressing terrorism threats in the early
twenty-first century induced expansions of the national security
state.34 These developments seemed to confirm the state’s monopoly
on national security production. Starting with the 2001 Authorization
for Use of Military Force35 and the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,36 Congress enacted a sequence of statutory delegations to enlarge the federal government’s regulatory reach.37 As it reorganized the federal
government’s intelligence and homeland security capacities,38 Congress also swelled the coffers of security and intelligence agencies,39
31
JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 69–70 (Jack N. Rakove ed., Penguin Putnam Inc. 1999)
(1787); see also DAVID C. HENDRICKSON, PEACE PACT: THE LOST WORLD OF THE AMERICAN
FOUNDING 213–14 (2003) (explaining the role of treaty violations in motivating the Constitution’s supporters).
32
Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 618 (1999).
33
Disagreement persists as to the precise allocation of these powers between the
branches. Compare LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT 248–86 (5th ed. 2007) (discussing and cataloging war powers and emphasizing
Congress’s role), with AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 140–44
(2005) (underscoring the development of “the central role of the federal executive in
military and national-security matters”). For a brief survey of the rise of executive power,
see Aziz Huq, Imperial March, DEMOCRACY, Winter 2008, at 44, 46–53, http://www.
democracyjournal.org/pdf/7/044-055.huq.final.pdf.
34
I do not mean to suggest that terrorism is a problem unique to the early twenty-first
century. See generally MICHAEL FELLMAN, IN THE NAME OF GOD AND COUNTRY: RECONSIDERING TERRORISM IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2010) (providing an insightful account of terrorism’s
influence across American history).
35
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224.
36
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
37
These statutory changes include the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (laying out the procedure for surveillance and the collection of
“foreign intelligence information”), the Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55,
121 Stat. 552 (amending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1801–11, 1821–29, 1841–46, 1861–62, 1871 (2006), by removing the warrant requirement for government surveillance of certain foreign intelligence targets), and the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (establishing military commissions and laying out their authorized powers).
38
See, e.g., Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-458, 118 Stat. 3638; see also Cohen et al., supra note 2, at 693–95 (describing the creation of the Department of Homeland Security).
39
See, e.g., Walter Pincus, Counterterrorism on a Budget, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2011, at
A13 (asserting that between fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year 2011, the Pentagon budget
grew from $432 billion to $725 billion).
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and channeled resources and training to state and local entities that
already bore front-line policing responsibilities.40 Although evaluations of the federal courts’ role remain contested, there is at least a
plausible argument that federal judges have indulged in mere symbolic objections but have not developed any particularized or effective
resistance to novel policy developments.41 In short, the attacks of 9/
11 led to a loosening of statutory and doctrinal constraints on the
national security state, even as fiscal and institutional commitments to
the state’s provision of national security as a public good deepened.
Government as a monopolist in the provision of national security
seemed never to have it so good.
B. Al Qaeda Evolves . . .
Yet just as the national security state evolved, so too did its adversaries. The United States and its allies have racked up numerous successes in targeting the core of al Qaeda leadership at the same time as
the organization has mutated, with the feverish ingenuity of a virus,
into modalities and social formations that are more resilient to the
American advantage in respect to pure military force. On the one
hand, the organization has diversified into new locations through
partnerships with local paramilitary organizations. On the other
hand, it has deepened its investments in propaganda aimed at potential recruits in the United States and Europe. In setting forth this
evolution, I will focus on the second strand of al Qaeda’s evolution
because it sets the stage for the social turn in counterterrorism policy
with which this Article is concerned.
Counterterrorism policy from 2001 to 2012 defies easy summary.
Two descriptive points from that history, however, are relevant to the
present argument—one concerning successes and the other about
failures.42 On the positive side of the ledger, the United States and its
allies have had large, if not uncontroversial, successes targeting the
core leadership of al Qaeda, including Osama bin Laden himself, in
and around the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.43 Increased employ40
See Matthew C. Waxman, National Security Federalism in the Age of Terror, 64 STAN. L.
REV. 289, 307–09 (2012). For a comprehensive survey of changes to local policing practices, see TO PROTECT AND TO SERVE: POLICING IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM passim (David Weisburd et al. eds., 2009).
41
See Aziz Z. Huq, What Good Is Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 401–07 (2010)
(using empirical data to argue the inefficacy of habeas corpus); cf. Aziz Z. Huq, Against
National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 236–40 [hereinafter Huq, Against
Exceptionalism] (arguing that national security jurisprudence is not a specialized response
to the domain’s particular problems).
42
In making these points, I do not mean to imply any positive or negative judgment
about any particular aspect of counterterrorism policy.
43
See 2011 NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY, supra note 8, at 1, 3 (noting bin
Laden’s death and the “many successes” in “disrupting terrorist plots, measurably reducing
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ment of unmanned aerial drones to target al Qaeda’s central leadership and operational capacities has resulted in the death of many
within the organization’s senior ranks,44 such as Abu Yahya al-Libi, the
organization’s erstwhile second-in-command.45 A larger military campaign has imposed “losses [on al Qaeda’s] physical structure, including training camps and leadership,” forcing dispersion across
Pakistan’s border into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA).46 This military campaign, to be sure, has not been wholly
successful—since 2003, for example, al Qaeda has been able to maintain training capabilities in the FATA47—but the damage inflicted by
the campaign to the organization’s core leadership has been unquestionably significant.48
The second observation concerns al Qaeda’s successes. Even as it
has been battered in Afghanistan and the FATA, al Qaeda has responded by shifting to a “more decentralized” form that is “far more
dependent on its autonomous field commands, its affiliates, its allies,
and its ability to inspire home-grown terrorists.”49 The result is more
“movement”50 or network than in a centralized entity working via
command and control. The recombinant al Qaeda is more resilient
to targeting by military tools that were previously effective.
the financial support available to the group, and inflicting significant leadership losses” as
a preface for further action).
44
See Peter Bergen et al., Assessing the Jihadist Terrorist Threat to America and American
Interests, 34 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 65, 81 (2011) (“Since the summer of 2008, U.S.
drones have killed scores of lower-ranking militants and at least a dozen mid- and upperlevel leaders within Al Qaeda or the Taliban in Pakistan’s tribal regions.”). The use of
unmanned aerial drones to assassinate al Qaeda leaders is strategically, morally, and legally
controversial. I do not mean to imply any position on those controversies here.
45
See Declan Walsh & Eric Schmitt, Al Qaeda’s No. 2 Said to Be Killed in a Drone Strike,
N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2012, at A1.
46
Rohan Gunaratna & Aviv Oreg, Al Qaeda’s Organizational Structure and Its Evolution,
33 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 1043, 1043–44 (2010).
47
See Leah Farrall, Forward Focus: Assessing Al-Qaeda’s In-Theater Capabilities, IHS DEF.,
SECURITY & RISK CONSULTING, Jan. 2012, at 14, 16; cf. Bergen et al., supra note 44, at 80–81
(discussing al Qaeda’s continuing strenghts).
48
For instance, upon the death of bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri—reportedly a more
polarizing and less inspiring figure within al Qaeda—took the leadership but has yet to
command the loyalty of his predecessor. See BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, RAND CORP., AL
QAEDA IN ITS THIRD DECADE: IRREVERSIBLE DECLINE OR IMMINENT VICTORY? 4–5 (2012)
[hereinafter JENKINS, THIRD DECADE], available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP362.pdf; see also Farrall, supra note 47, at
18 (noting that al Qaeda now “lacks an authoritative self-produced internal figure to provide doctrinal and ideological guidance, and provide legitimacy to any changes in direction or focus”).
49
JENKINS, THIRD DECADE, supra note 48, at 4; see also Joby Warrick, Differing Al Qaeda
Images Paint a Still-Dangerous Foe, BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 9, 2010, at 10 (noting decline in al
Qaeda’s ability “to wage mass-casualty terrorism” but an uptick in “small-scale operations
that are far harder to detect and disrupt”).
50
Gunaratna & Oreg, supra note 46, at 1047.
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Two strands of this mutation stand out. Only one, though, is of
central relevance here. The first (less relevant for present purposes)
development in al Qaeda involves the emergence and growth of new,
localized terrorist organizations in weak or failed states, including the
North African al Qaeda in the Magreb (AQIM), Ansar Dine in Mali,
the Shabaab in Somalia, and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP) in Yemen.51 These organizations’ lack of geographic propinquity does not necessarily diminish the threat they pose. Successive
AQAP attempts to attack the United States52 as well as AQIM’s recent
seizure of de facto state power in parts of northern Mali53 demonstrate as much. The early successes of this “resurgent tide” of al
Qaeda affiliates, some analysts conclude, suggest that the United
States will face serious terrorism risk for at least the medium term,54 a
concern only fueled by the perception that jihadist groups have successfully exploited armed conflicts that emerged from the Arab
Spring.55 However important these developments may be as a practical matter, they have not yet stimulated theoretical reorientation in
counterterrorism strategy of the sort relevant here.56
But there is a second important development involving the decentralization of terrorist risk, one that has catalyzed an important rethinking of the roots of national security in ways central to the topic of
this Article. In yet another response to military and drone campaigns,
“[a]l Qaeda and its allies have increased their efforts to inspire and
51
See Bergen et al., supra note 44, at 71–74; Gunaratna & Oreg, supra note 46, at 1051;
see also BRUCE RIEDEL, THE SEARCH FOR AL QAEDA: ITS LEADERSHIP, IDEOLOGY, AND FUTURE
124–27 (2008) (describing the growth of al Qaeda “[s]afe [h]avens and [f]ranchises”). I
exclude the Nigerian group Boko Haram from this analysis because serious studies of that
group suggest it has a quite different etiology and, at least to date, a more localized
agenda. For an excellent study on this topic, see generally INT’L CRISIS GRP., NORTHERN
NIGERIA: BACKGROUND TO CONFLICT (2010), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/
media/Files/africa/west-africa/nigeria/168%20Northern%20Nigeria%20-%20Back
ground%20to%20Conflict.
52
See JOHN ROLLINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41070, AL QAEDA AND AFFILIATES: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, GLOBAL PRESENCE, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 16–17 (2011),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41070.pdf.
53
See Secession in Mali: An Unholy Alliance, ECONOMIST, June 2, 2012, at 61 (describing
the capture of state power by Ansar Eddine, an AQIM ally, in an area of northern Mali
proclaimed to be the independent state of Azawad).
54
See Seth G. Jones, Think Again: Al Qaeda, FOREIGN POL’Y, May/June 2012, at 47, 47.
55
This appears to be especially so in Syria. Neil MacFarquhar & Hwaida Saad,
Jihadists Taking a Growing Role in Syrian Revolt, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2012, at A1.
56
The increased use of unmanned aerial drones, though, is a tactical response to
these developments. See generally STANFORD LAW SCH. INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS & CONFLICT
RESOLUTION CLINIC & NYU SCH. OF LAW GLOBAL JUSTICE CLINIC, LIVING UNDER DRONES:
DEATH, INJURY, AND TRAUMA TO CIVILIANS FROM US DRONE PRACTICES IN PAKISTAN (2012),
available at http://livingunderdrones.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Stanford_NYU_
LIVING_UNDER_DRONES.pdf (providing an empirically informed and highly critical review of the use of such drones).
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recruit homegrown terrorists.”57 From al Qaeda’s perspective, this organizational reorientation takes the form of new investments in propaganda and recruitment using intermediaries and the Internet.58
Those investments have yielded an uptick in concern about terrorist
conspiracies, attempts, and attacks across the United States and Europe directed and executed by individuals or loosely knit organizations that are wholly or largely disconnected from al Qaeda central.59
Providing some substantiation of this perception, a 2008 study “estimated that some 80% of new recruits to the global Salafi jihad emerge
from the diaspora” originally from Muslim majority nations.60
As early as 2006, the United States’ national intelligence estimate
had flagged a “growing number of radical, self-generating cells in
Western countries” and an expanding “radical and violent segment of
the West’s Muslim population.”61 Since then, domestic-origin groups
and individuals in Europe have committed a range of terrorist acts,
from “unsophisticated acts of violence . . . and solitary assassinations”
to “large-scale ‘spectacular’ attacks.”62 The precise organizational
structures at work in the commission of such terrorism seem to vary
between the United Kingdom and the United States. An innovative
recent study employing social networking techniques to map data accumulated from American and European prosecutions, for example,
57
JENKINS, THIRD DECADE supra note 48, at 7; accord BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, RAND
CORP., WOULD-BE WARRIORS: INCIDENTS OF JIHADIST TERRORIST RADICALIZATION IN THE
UNITED STATES SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, at 1–2 (2010) [hereinafter JENKINS, WOULD-BE
WARRIORS], available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_
papers/2010/RAND_OP292.pdf.
58
See, e.g., Richard Spencer, Al-Qaeda Newspaper: Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your
Mom, TELEGRAPH (U.K.), July 1, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/
7865978/Al-Qaeda-newspaper-Make-a-bomb-in-the-kitchen-of-your-mom.html (describing
al Qaeda’s online magazine Inspire).
59
See Leah Farrall, How Al Qaeda Works: What the Organization’s Subsidiaries Say About Its
Strength, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 128, 133, 136–37 (2011) (describing the evolution of al Qaeda
into “a devolved network hierarchy, in which levels of command authority are not always
clear”); Keith Johnson, Officials Spotlight Domestic Terrorism Threat, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2011,
at A5 (“[L]one-wolf extremists with little or no formal connection to al Qaeda have proliferated and are potentially plotting small-scale attacks in the U.S., officials said.”).
60
Arie W. Kruglanski et al., What Should This Fight Be Called?: Metaphors of Counterterrorism and Their Implications, 8 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 97, 114 (2008).
61
NAT’L INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE: THE TERRORIST
THREAT TO THE US HOMELAND 6 (2007) [hereinafter 2007 NIE], available at http://dni.
gov/files/documents/NIE_terrorist%20threat%202007.pdf. The National Intelligence Estimate is “the Intelligence Community’s (IC) most authoritative written judgments on national security issues and [is] designed to help US civilian and military leaders develop
policies to protect US national security interests.” Id. at 2; see also Intelligence Reform: Hearing
Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 110th Cong. 89 (2007) (statement of Charles E.
Allen, Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, Chief Intelligence Officer, Department of Homeland Security) (describing the new focus on “domestic terrorists” including
“Islamic extremists (Sunni and Shia)”).
62
Gunaratna & Oreg, supra note 46, at 1053; see also Bergen et al., supra note 44, at
84–85 (documenting global spread of such smaller, more self-starting groups).
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found material differences in the relation of terrorist conspiracies to
each other and to transnational networks.63 Whereas in the United
States individuals connected to recent terrorism incidents tend to be
isolated from larger transnational networks, those in London appear
to be much more closely connected to a small group of “sheikhs” and
al Qaeda facilitators such as (the now apparently deceased) Rashid
Rauf.64 This study suggests that patterns of domestic-source terrorism
in the United States and Europe have taken different paths, with European-focused conspiracies maintaining tighter connections to either the core of al Qaeda in the FATA region65 or specific
“gatekeepers”66 to the larger organization who tend to act as catalysts
for individuals or groups in Europe but not in the United States.
To be sure, large disagreements persist about this trend, two of
which merit brief adumbration. First, academics and officials disagree
about the mechanics of what has come to be labeled “violent radicalization.”67 A threshold problem in this field is that careless empirics
and invidious stereotyping mar many official and semi-official studies
that lay foundations for the formulation of official policy.68 Even setting aside empirically and normatively flawed analyses, there is still
substantial disagreement in scholarly circles, exacerbated by a dearth
of unbiased factual evidence, which impedes the ability to reach firm
predictions (let alone conclusions) about the individual etiology of
terrorism.69 For the purposes of this Article, it suffices to say that the
63
See Eliane Tschaen Barbieri & Jytte Klausen, Al Qaeda’s London Branch: Patterns of
Domestic and Transnational Network Integration, 35 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 411, 426–28
(2012).
64
See id. at 412, 419–26 (presenting data in graphical form on both the United States
and London).
65
See id. at 427. But cf. Javier Jordan, Analysis of Jihadi Terrorism Incidents in Western
Europe, 2001–2010, 35 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 382, 388 (2012) (noting evidence of
group members spending time at a training camp outside Western Europe in only onethird of European terrorism cases).
66
Petter Nesser, Jihadism in Western Europe After the Invasion of Iraq: Tracing Motivational
Influences from the Iraq War on Jihadist Terrorism in Western Europe, 29 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 323, 326 (2006) (describing “gatekeepers” as “veteran militants who fought against
the Soviets in the 1980s, or radicals who have trained in jihad camps”).
67
For a useful overview, see Gary LaFree & Gary Ackerman, The Empirical Study of
Terrorism: Social and Legal Research, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 347, 348–49 (2009).
68
See Aziz Z. Huq, Modeling Terrorist Radicalization, 2 DUKE F. FOR L. & SOC. CHANGE
39, 48–60 (2010) (describing and critiquing U.K. and U.S. models of radicalization).
69
See, e.g., Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, Violent Radicalizatation in Europe: What We Know and
What We Do Not Know, 33 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 797, 798 (2010) (describing three
competing models of radicalization, one based on identarian crises, another on social
movements, and a third on individual-level factors); see also John Horgan, From Profiles to
Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives from Psychology on Radicalization into Terrorism, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., July 2008, at 80, 82–83 (stressing variance in radicalization models). One recent study finds more evidence of group-level than individual-level
process. See Scott Matthew Kleinmann, Radicalization of Homegrown Sunni Militants in the
United States: Comparing Converts and Non-Converts, 35 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 278,
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diverse empirical, theoretical, and polemical literature on radicalization evinces considerable discord, such that the goal of predicting
who among the pacific many will employ violence for political ends
remains a remote one. Psychology, personal circumstance, social context, and ideas (some political, some religious, some just muddled) all
likely play a role, but how each precisely does remains obscure.
Second, disagreement also persists as to whether the domesticsource threat is a distinctively European problem or whether it is also
equally a concern for the United States. Even U.S. government officials seem to evaluate the transatlantic divide differently. On the one
hand, Congress has conducted extensive investigations into (among
other things) terrorist recruitment in prisons70 and al Shabaab recruitment within Minneapolis’s Somali community.71 The ensuing
congressional reports promote the view that Americans should be
gravely concerned about domestic-source political violence.72
Respected commentators have also concluded that such terrorism afflicts both sides of the Atlantic.73 Finally, a growing emphasis on the
role of the Internet as a vehicle for disseminating terrorist propaganda provides yet another reason for positing that the transatlantic
divide may make little difference.74 On the other hand, a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate observed that “this internal Muslim terrorist threat is not likely to be as severe [in the United States] as it is in
Europe” and that other “non-Muslim terrorist groups . . . probably will
279, 288 (2012); see also Aziz Z. Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in Domestic
Counterterrorism, 89 TEX. L. REV. 833, 880–90 (2011) [hereinafter Huq, Signaling Function]
(emphasizing group-level dynamics).
70
See generally Prison Radicalization: Are Terrorist Cells Forming in U.S. Cell Blocks?: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (examining
American prisons and their potential role in cultivating homegrown terrorism).
71
See generally Violent Islamist Extremism: Al-Shabaab Recruitment in America: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 100–04 (2009) (statement of J. Philip Mudd, Associate Executive Assistant Director, National Security Branch,
Federal Bureau of Investigation) (discussing the American Somali community). See also id.
at 97 (statement of Andrew M. Liepman, Deputy Director of Intelligence, National
Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence) (same).
72
See JEROME P. BJELOPERA & MARK A. RANDOL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41416, AMERICAN JIHADIST TERRORISM: COMBATING A COMPLEX THREAT 61 (2010), available at http://fpc.
state.gov/documents/organization/153298.pdf (“[H]omegrown jihadist terrorism remains a danger.”).
73
See, e.g., Evan F. Kohlmann, “Homegrown” Terrorists: Theory and Cases in the War on
Terror’s Newest Front, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., July 2008, at 95, 96–97; accord
Bergen et al., supra note 44, at 66–67.
74
See BJELOPERA & RANDOL, supra note 72, at 2, 18–21 (arguing that the availability of
propaganda on the Internet aids terrorist efforts in that individuals interested in jihad no
longer need to travel for indoctrination or training); cf. War in the Fifth Domain: Are the
Mouse and Keyboard the New Weapons of Conflict?, ECONOMIST, July 3, 2010, at 25 (discussing
the Internet’s ability to aid both governments and terrorists and enable attacks at a
distance).
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conduct attacks . . . [, though] on a small scale.”75 Supporting this
conclusion are 2010 and 2012 studies of domestic-source terrorism
conducted by the RAND Institute. As the first of these studies notes,
“the number of terrorist recruits [in the United States] is still tiny.”76
A follow-up RAND study reached a similar conclusion, albeit with
some reservations; it also pointedly noted that three of the six conspiracies involving attacks in the United States involved federal stings,77
arguably suggesting that even the observed threat may be a result, in
part, of aggressive law enforcement tactics eliciting violence where
none would otherwise arise.78
Notwithstanding these disagreements and ambiguities, government officials still seem to agree that the domestic-source strain of al
Qaeda–related terrorism is a significant evolutionary response to previous counterterrorism successes.79 That accord has in turn catalyzed
novel kinds of official action and thinking about how to respond to
the new forms and causes of al Qaeda–inspired violence, given that
what previously proved most effective—assassination by aerial drone,
the deployment of special forces, and other species of military force—
is turning out to be increasingly ill-suited to the task at hand.
C. . . . The State Responds
Many of the ensuing state responses are familiar. For example,
governments have sought new instruments for investigation and surveillance.80 They have expanded agencies’ technical and logistical capacities to engage in intelligence work, sometimes beyond that
75

R

76

R

2007 NIE, supra note 61, at 6.
JENKINS, WOULD-BE WARRIORS, supra note 57, at 4; see also BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS,
RAND CORP., Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies: Radicalization and Recruitment to Jihadist
Terrorism in the United States Since 9/11, at 1 (2011) [hereinafter JENKINS, Stray Dogs],
available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/
RAND_OP343.pdf (“[D]espite al Qaeda’s intensive online recruiting campaign, their numbers remain small, their determination limp, and their competence poor.”).
77
JENKINS, Stray Dogs, supra note 76, at 19.
78
This is a symptom of a more general problem in terrorism policy, where much of
the usable data flows from governmental practices designed not to generate accurate results but to mitigate risks without regard to the negative externalities from such precautionary action.
79
See ROLLINS, supra note 52, at 1–2 (suggesting that U.S. counterterrorism strategy
has caused al Qaeda to decentralize into smaller cells, which in turn may pose a domestic
threat); see also 2007 NIE, supra note 61, at 6 (stating that, while worldwide counterterrorism efforts have affected al Qaeda’s ability to attack, the growth of “radical, self-generating
cells” in the United States remains a threat); 2011 EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra
note 9, at 2 (“[T]hese groups are actively seeking to recruit or inspire Americans to carry
out attacks against the United States, particularly as they are facing greater pressure in
their safe-havens abroad.”).
80
See supra text accompanying notes 2–4.
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authorized by statute.81 And they have developed diverse arrays of
counterradicalization strategies.82 The ensuing slate of responses has
deepened the state’s monopoly on security production, with one important exception. The exception to this trend—which has largely
escaped sustained attention or theorization until now—turns prevailing accounts of national security as a public good on their head.
Rather than seeking to monopolize security’s production, governments on both sides of the Atlantic have turned to private action as a
mechanism for addressing the new decentralized and dispersed variety of nonstate terrorism risk.83 They have stated or implied that governments do not, and should not, have a monopoly on the production
of national security. At odds with the traditional view of security as a
public good, governments are conceptualizing counterterrorism in
some measure as a socially produced good, in other words, one generated through the decisions and behaviors of dispersed private actors
outside the control or direction of the state.84
The idea of harnessing social inputs for the production of
counterterrorism has been a common thread in policy documents issued by the U.S. and U.K. governments since at least 2010.85 The following section documents the emergence of this idea as a prelude to
81
See, e.g., James Bamford, The NSA Is Building the Country’s Biggest Spy Center (Watch
What You Say), WIRED (Mar. 15, 2012, 7:24 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/
03/ff_nsadatacenter/all/1 (describing the development of a federal capacity to capture,
copy, and analyze all telephone calls made in the United States).
82
See Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of Counter-Radicalization, 64 STAN. L. REV. 125, 148–61 (2012) (documenting various counterradicalization
strategies and their development).
83
See, e.g., Robert Lambert & Jonathan Githens-Mazer, Prevent Is Dead. What Next?,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), July 14, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2010/
jul/14/prevent-counter-radicalisation-terrorism-islam?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487
(describing the U.K.’s Prevent strategy and its core principle of communities assuming
responsibility for counterterrorism efforts); Dina Temple-Raston, Officials Detail Plans to
Fight Homegrown Terrorism, NPR (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/12/08/
143319965/officials-detail-plans-to-fight-terrorism-at-home (discussing the Obama administration’s counterterrorism strategy and its base in partnerships between local actors, such
as schools, community boards, and law enforcement, to combat domestic terrorism).
84
In any event, the common association of public goods with state production is too
broad; a public good’s production often does not require state intervention. See generally
ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990) (providing examples of private provision of collective goods). Formal
models of collective dynamics also reveal the possibility that where there is heterogeneity
amongst potential contributions, the equilibrium outcome from efforts at coordinated action will not necessarily be suboptimal. See, e.g., GERALD MARWELL & PAMELA OLIVER, THE
CRITICAL MASS IN COLLECTIVE ACTION: A MICRO-SOCIAL THEORY 10 (1993) (“Homogenous
groups yield very different results from heterogeneous groups.”).
85
This Article focuses on British and American policy because they are immediately
accessible and of direct relevance. Other European nations have developed policy based
on studies of interactions between violent and nonviolent “extremist” groups. See, e.g.,
GEN. INTELLIGENCE & SEC. SERV. OF THE NETH., THE RADICAL DAWA IN TRANSITION: THE RISE
OF ISLAMIC NEORADICALISM IN THE NETHERLANDS 22–24 (2007).
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more systematic exploration of its causal foundations and policy implications. Thorough analysis of formal British and American policy, as
well as the available evidence of how policy works on the ground,
demonstrates that whereas both governments have endorsed the utility of social production of counterterrorism, neither has developed a
robust account of its causal foundations. Nor have these governments
considered potential counterarguments. Further, official sources only
weakly flesh out the policy implications of a social turn in counterterrorism. Accordingly, this section summarizes the relevant British and
American policies as a foundation for Part II’s investigation of causal
mechanisms.
1. The Prevent Strategy
From 2006 onward, concerns about domestic-source terrorism
have animated British responses to al Qaeda.86 Early policy documents characterized counterterrorism as “a battle of ideas in which
success will depend upon all parts of the community challenging the
ideological motivations used to justify the use of violence.”87 Building
on that view, the British Home Office—which is institutionally responsible for counterterrorism—developed what came to be known as the
“Prevent” strand of a four-part “Contest” counterterrorism strategy as
a way of harnessing private action for counterterrorism ends.88
Among its defining characteristics, Prevent has been identified with a
“wider social scale” that includes “softer engagement with local entities.”89 It is founded on the assumption that “community-based partners can . . . reduce th[e] appeal” of al Qaeda and its affiliates.90 As
early as 2007, the Home Office was allocating funds to religious “roadshows,” forums, and religious advisory councils in order to militate
against individuals turning to terrorism.91 In its first five years, Pre86

See PRIME MINISTER & SEC’Y OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEP’T, COUNTERING INTERNATERRORISM: THE UNITED KINGDOM’S STRATEGY, Cm. 6888, at 3 (2006), available at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20060715135117/http://www.ukresilience.
info/publications/countering.pdf (noting the catalytic effect of the July 2005 train and bus
bombings).
87
Id.
88
See PRIME MINISTER & SEC’Y OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEP’T, PURSUE PREVENT PROTECT PREPARE: THE UNITED KINGDOM’S STRATEGY FOR COUNTERING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, Cm. 7547, at 10–13 (2009), available at http://merln.ndu.edu/whitepapers/United
Kingdom2009.pdf; see also PREVENT GUIDE, supra note 11, at 7 (working to implement “Prevent” by emphasizing the need for engagement of the community by local authorities in
combating terrorism).
89
Clive Walker & Javaid Rehman, ‘Prevent’ Responses to Jihadi Extremism, in GLOBAL
ANTI-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY 242, 243 (Victor V. Ramraj et al. eds., 2d ed. 2012).
90
Id. at 251.
91
See PREVENT GUIDE, supra note 11, at 2, 7. More than half of this funding went to
“[d]ebates, discussions and forums,” and about a third went to “[g]eneral educational activities.” PREVENT STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 28. Contemporaneous policy statements also
reveal that tertiary education institutions were a site of particular interest and concern at
TIONAL
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vent became a wide-ranging source of funding for diverse projects.
Between 2008 and 2011, the U.K. government disbursed about
£45,700,000 under the Prevent banner.92 Those funds were apportioned geographically in line with the distribution of the U.K.’s Muslim population.93
Despite (or perhaps because of) its scale, the first iteration of Prevent sparked sharp criticism from both the political right—which objected to the allocation of funds to Muslim organizations that it
deemed insufficiently integrated into larger British society94—and the
political left—which viewed Prevent as an excuse to allow extensive
government surveillance targeting only Muslim communities.95 Yet
others lambasted the program for becoming “as much about the government-inspired social engineering of integration as it was about
stopping terrorist attacks.”96 A subsequent parliamentary inquiry concurred in some of these negative assessments, although it did not endorse or find empirical support for the claim that the Prevent
program had become a vehicle for surveillance.97 Striking a similarly
negative note, an internal government review concluded that Prevent
this stage of Prevent’s development. See U.K. DEP’T FOR EDUC. & SKILLS, PROMOTING GOOD
CAMPUS RELATIONS: WORKING WITH STAFF AND STUDENTS TO BUILD COMMUNITY COHESION
AND TACKLE VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE NAME OF ISLAM AT UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES 7–9
(2006), available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20070402090550/http://
www.dfes.gov.uk/hegateway/uploads/ExtremismGuidancefinal.pdf (noting that in universities, “extremism can also be disproportionately affected by the simultaneous presence of
a few like-minded individuals,” by ethnic segregation, and by charismatic outside speakers).
92
PREVENT STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 28.
93
Id. at 34.
94
See Dominic Casciani, Terrorism Strategy Lacks Clarity, Says Minister, BBC (U.K.) (Dec.
8, 2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8400734.stm (quoting a Conservative official criticizing Prevent and suggesting that the United Kingdom should “shift the emphasis
of funding to groups which bring the community together, rather than single group funding which is divisive”); Alan Travis, Government ‘Prevent’ Strategy Widened to Combat Rightwing
Racism, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Sept. 8, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/sep/
08/prevent-strategy-rightwing-racism (describing the government response to criticism of
Prevent, including new guidelines requiring funding “to be delivered through a wide range
of local groups” instead of “a single ethnic or faith community”).
95
See Vikram Dodd, Communities Fear Project Is Not What It Seems, GUARDIAN (U.K.),
Oct. 16, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2009/oct/16/prevent-counter-islamicextremism-intelligence; see also Jack Barclay, The Extremist Reaction to the UK’s Prevent Strategy,
CURRENT TRENDS ISLAMIST IDEOLOGY, 2011, at 73, 74–79, available at www.currenttrends.
org/research/detail/the-extremist-reaction-to-the-uks-prevent-strategy (describing reactions to the United Kingdom’s counterterrorism efforts among some sections of the British
Muslim community).
96
Lambert & Githens-Mazer, supra note 83.
97
See COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT COMMITTEE, PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM, 2009–10, H.C. 65, at 3–4 (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.
uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmcomloc/65/65.pdf. The parliamentary investigation concluded that “Prevent risks undermining positive cross-cultural work on cohesion and capacity building to combat exclusion and alienation in many communities” and that the
strategy had inappropriately focused on theological explanations for radicalization. Id. at
3.
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had failed to develop an effective counternarrative to al Qaeda propaganda98 and further criticized the Home Office for “seeking to make
language acceptable to some in Muslim communities, at the expense
of candour.”99
Political change after the May 2010 elections invited a policy shift.
The new coalition government dramatically reoriented Prevent,100
creating a new strategy that was styled as “a significant departure from
the previous [Prevent] strategy.”101 Centrally, the coalition government emphasized that it would no longer provide Prevent funding to
any “extremist organizations,” in deference to right-of-center critiques.102 Reflecting left-of-center critiques, the government determined that it would also no longer allocate funding “according to a
crude calculation of Muslim population density” but instead would allocate in line with assessments of “activity . . . by terrorist organisations
and terrorist sympathisers.”103 Moreover, it would ramp up “monitoring and evaluation” of projects to prevent the “waste [of] public funds
on projects irrelevant to” counterterrorism.104
At the heart of the revamped Prevent strategy is a new focus on
“[c]hallenging ideology,”105 particularly “ideology which sanctions the
use of violence.”106 Prevent thus configures the central task of
counterterrorism as ideological, pitching the government into a contest of ideas arising within domestic society.107 The ideologies of gravest concern to the Prevent strategy repudiate a “cohesive, integrated,
98

See CONTEST: U.K.’S STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 64.
PREVENT STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 48.
100
See Alan Travis, Theresa May Pledges ‘Significant’ Reform of Counter-Terrorism Laws,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Nov. 3, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/nov/03/
theresa-may-counter-terrorism-reform.
101
PREVENT STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 39.
102
Id. (“It will not be part of this strategy to use extremists to deal with the risk from
radicalisation.”). Elsewhere, the Home Office explains that “some terrorist ideologies draw
on and make use of extremist ideas which are espoused and circulated by apparently nonviolent organisations.” CONTEST: U.K.’S STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 12. Not all elements of
the parliamentary coalition concurred in this move. See Allegra Stratton, Are We There Yet?
Clegg and PM Agree to Disagree, GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 2, 2011, at 11, available at http://
www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2011/jun/01/nick-clegg-david-cameron-disagree?INTCMP=
SRCH (describing Charles Farr, the head of the U.K. Office for Security and CounterTerrorism, as “believ[ing] that to get to the really nasty guys, you have to engage with the
not-so-nasty guys”).
103
PREVENT STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 40.
104
CONTEST: U.K.’S STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 12.
105
PREVENT STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 44.
106
Id. at 5; see also id. at 46 (noting, with regard to al Qaeda propaganda in Britain,
that there are “comparatively few texts [that] circulate on the internet and in hard copy”
but that these are nevertheless “carefully studied and debated”). This focus on challenging
violent ideology is echoed in a recent report by the Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, a Beltway advocacy group. See Carpenter et al., supra note 7, at 303.
107
See PREVENT STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 24 (“Preventing people [from] becoming
terrorists will require a challenge to extremist ideas . . . .”).
99
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multi-faith society.”108 There is a note of irony in this: Prevent targets
groups that evince a hostility to aspirations of a multicultural society
in which sharply different cultures coexist rather than ebb away.109
Yet this hostility is widely shared on the political right in Europe, even
if it has a quite different valance from Islamist opposition to the same
idea.
Even with this new, if undertheorized, focus upon the ideological,
the Prevent strategy’s instruments remain substantially unchanged.
The Home Office assumes that “community based organisations
[have] better capability to challenge the ideology [of] Al Qa’ida.”110
Rather than substituting state for private action, the government will
offer these organizations “professional communication skills . . . to
challenge [terrorist] ideology.”111 To the same end, the Home Office
commits to developing “sharper and more professional counter-narrative products” as well as new “projects in education, communities and
the criminal justice system” that can act as platforms from which to
counter dangerous ideologies.112 Through these instruments, the
Home Office’s new iteration of Prevent is intended to “effectively engage[ ] with and use[ ] the influence and reach of communities and
community groups”113 as a way of negating propaganda efforts by al
Qaeda and its ilk.
In short, the United Kingdom has engaged in an extended and
detailed debate about the social production of counterterrorism. But
this debate does not necessarily provide a useful guide for American
policymakers. While Prevent’s trajectory might seem to highlight a
range of important disagreements that can emerge in conceptualizing
counterterrorism’s social production, its lessons may perhaps be
rather more subtle, parochial, and circumscribed. All of the core controversies sparked by Prevent reflect broader public debates about
multiculturalism and the place of Islam in British society. These
resonances at least suggest that the contents of the Prevent policy have
attracted attention only to the extent they touch on points of ambient
social sensitivity. Consider the debate on extremism versus modera108

Id. at 5.
See id. at 27 (noting that political and social cohesion “makes communities more
resilient to terrorist ideology and propagandists” despite conceding that “apparently wellintegrated people have committed terrorist attacks”).
110
CONTEST: U.K.’S STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 61. Along these lines, mosques are
singled out as having “taken a leading role in challenging terrorism,” and the new Prevent
strategy is intended to “support the key role of imams in reaching young Muslims and
being able to engage with them.” Id. at 64.
111
PREVENT STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 48; see also id. at 52 (stating that the new Prevent strategy will retain many of the previous counternarrative strategies).
112
Id. at 51–52; see also id. at 75 (exploring the “important role” that tertiary educators
play in preventing their students from being willing to employ terrorist violence).
113
Id. at 7.
109

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\98-3\CRN303.txt

658

unknown

Seq: 22

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

11-MAR-13

12:26

[Vol. 98:637

tion. The relevant scholarship on this topic is hardly clear, but it certainly does not support the sort of dichotomies assumed in the
debates around Prevent. For example, scholarship about Salafism, the
religious current from which al Qaeda emerged, describes linkages
between religious extremism and political action as “puzzling, slippery
and fascinating,”114 with “complex” and “hybrid” linkages of religious
tradition and political action115 that resist facile dichotomization of
the sort witnessed around the Prevent strategy. Rather than reflecting
a central distinction for counterterrorism choice, the debate about extremists versus moderates that is so salient in the United Kingdom
may reflect a deeper, abiding discomfort in some quarters about the
more general direction of British society. Hence, the categories generated in debates over Prevent may have local salience but may not be
useful keys to grasp the core problems in the general social production of counterterrorism.
2. Empowering Local Partners
A useful starting point in considering the American approach to
national security’s social production is the Obama administration’s
first National Security Strategy (NSS).116 The NSS is not the first official effort to grapple with the social production of counterterrorism.
Soon after 9/11, local law enforcement agencies in places such as
Dearborn, Michigan, realized the value of harnessing social action for
public safety ends and began working to deepen their existing relations with Arab-American communities.117 But such local efforts have
been atypical and undertheorized,118 making them a weak foundation
114
Roel Meijer, Introduction to GLOBAL SALAFISM: ISLAM’S NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT 1,
17 (Roel Meijer ed., 2009). The Salafist movement has generated both quietist and politically active currents. See Quintan Wiktorowicz, Anatomy of the Salafi Movement, 29 STUD.
CONFLICT & TERRORISM 207, 208, 225–28 (2006). Consequently, there is no simple or
mechanistic mapping of religious sentiments into political action.
115
Thomas Hegghammer, Jihadi-Salafis or Revolutionaries?: On Religion and Politics in the
Study of Militant Islamism, in GLOBAL SALAFISM: ISLAM’S NEW RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT, supra
note 114, at 244, 264.
116
2010 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 8.
117
See David Thacher, The Local Role in Homeland Security, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 635,
647–50 (2005) (developing an insightful account of the Dearborn Police Department’s
efforts to maintain the support of the Arab community in counterterrorism efforts).
118
Many other local police departments took the opposite approach and targeted
whole groups based solely on religious or ethnic identity for heightened surveillance and
investigation. For example, the Associated Press has revealed an extensive surveillance and
intelligence effort by the New York Police Department (NYPD) directed at both Muslim
Americans and those perceived to be Muslim in both New York City and throughout the
Northeastern states. See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, NYPD Keeps Files on Muslims
Who Change Their Names, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 26, 2011, available at http://www.ap.org/
Content/AP-In-The-News/2011/NYPD-keeps-files-on-Muslims-who-change-their-names;
Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, NYPD Monitored Where Muslims Ate, Shopped, Prayed, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20110831/us-
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for analysis. In any event, there is little indication that they directly
informed the 2010 NSS. The NSS was instead touted as a dramatic
reorientation of American strategic priorities away from directions
preferred by President George W. Bush’s administration.119 Although
its focus on economic strength captured more public attention,120 the
2010 NSS’s concession that government lacks a monopoly on the production of security against terrorism was also noteworthy. While it references the private production of national security only briefly, even
this fleeting mention was sufficient to set the stage for subsequent policy elaboration.
In prefatory comments, the 2010 NSS referred ambiguously to
“prepared, vigilant, and engaged communities,” and then, in a paragraph entitled “Empowering Communities to Counter Radicalization,” it expressly posited that “well informed and equipped families,
local communities, and institutions” are among the “best defenses”
against domestic-source terrorism.121 The NSS also anticipated investments in both “intelligence” and “community engagement and development programs” to expedite those defenses.122 As a general
statement of administration policy, the NSS does not provide specifics
to justify assigning “communities” a role in counterterrorism or to explain how particular projected investments would mitigate terrorism
risks.123
nypd-intelligence/; Adam Goldman et al., AP Impact: NYPD Ethnic Tracking Included Citizens,
YAHOO! NEWS, Sept. 22, 2011, available at http://news.yahoo.com/ap-impact-nypd-ethnictracking-included-citizens-173717936.html; Chris Hawley, NYPD Monitored Muslim Students
All over Northeast, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 18, 2012, available at http://www.ap.org/
Content/AP-In-The-News/2012/NYPD-monitored-Muslim-students-all-over-Northeast;
Eileen Sullivan, NYPD Spied on City’s Muslim Anti-Terror Partners, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 6,
2011, available at http://www.ap.org/Content/AP-In-The-News/2011/NYPD-spied-on-citysMuslim-anti-terror-partners. I do not address here the important issues under the Equal
Protection and Religion Clauses of the Constitution raised by the singling out of specific
religious groups on the sole basis of a faith affiliation.
119
See David E. Sanger & Peter Baker, Obama Reorients Approach of National Security Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2010, at A8 (quoting Obama administration officials’ desire for “a
document that recognizes the world as it is and ends a[n] era of illusion in which Washington confused projecting power with achieving results”).
120
See, e.g., Karen DeYoung, National Security Strategy Looks Beyond Military Might, WASH.
POST, May 27, 2010, at A4.
121
2010 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 8, at 16, 19. The NSS speaks in a
different paragraph to the more general topic of “individual and community preparedness.” Id. at 19.
122
Id.
123
Several observers have voiced similar criticism. See, e.g., Stephen Biddle et al.,
Obama’s NSS: Promise and Pitfalls, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (May 28, 2010), http://www.
cfr.org/defensehomeland-security/obamas-nss-promise-pitfalls/p22240 (“[T]he NSS goal
of empowering communities to immunize them against radicalization may prove difficult
to carry out, if only because the U.S. government is not organized for this purpose.”); Anna
Gawel, Obama’s National Security Strategy Clarifies Vision, but Blueprint Fuzzy, WASH. DIPLOMAT
(Aug. 2010), http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=6843:obamas-national-security-strategy-clarifies-vision-but-blueprint-fuzzy&
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A year later, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism (NSC)
furnished more details.124 That document identified as a policy desideratum communities’ resilience “against al-Qa’ida inspired radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization to violence.”125 It explained that
“engagement and partnership with communities” would augment that
resilience but also cautioned that community relations could not be
“reduced to a one-size-fits-all approach” and that specific “local stakeholders [would be permitted to] develop solutions tailored to their
own particular circumstances.”126 The 2011 NSC developed the NSS’s
opening bid by linking social action to a particularized—and, in mid2011, highly salient—al Qaeda tactic: the efforts by the (now-deceased) American national Anwar al-Awlaki and others to propagandize Americans through the Internet.127 What remains opaque in the
2011 NSC, however, is precisely how “communities” interpose themselves between the al-Awlakis of the world and their targets, and how
governmental action has the potential to augment the effectiveness of
such private interventions.
Perhaps demanding detailed microfoundations in statements of
general administration policy is unrealistic. In many domains of national security law, the government works out details but never articulates them in public formats. In August and December 2011,
nevertheless, the White House published two policy documents, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States and
a Strategic Implementation Plan for achieving that goal, which promised
more details.128 Indeed, this pair of documents provides a thicker account of how social action might translate into improved security. But
the documents still leave unresolved important questions about causal
foundations and policy consequences. They thus leave open the possibility that even the government remains confused about the relevant
mechanisms of risk reduction.
Consider first the roles Empowering Local Partners assigned to private actors and the federal government. Both the related policy docucatid=209:august-2010&Itemid=235 (“[T]he NSS offers few specifics on the many issues it
raises, particularly Obama’s sweeping domestic agenda.”).
124
2011 NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY, supra note 8.
125
Id. at 11.
126
Id.
127
By then, it was well known that al-Awlaki’s lecture, “The Constants of Jihad,” had
helped inspire a 2007 attempt on a Fort Dix, New Jersey army base and that al-Awlaki
himself had corresponded with Major Nidal Hassan, who in November 2009 had been
responsible for the only homeland deaths from al Qaeda–related terrorism. See SETH G.
JONES, HUNTING IN THE SHADOWS: THE PURSUIT OF AL QA’IDA SINCE 9/11, at 287–97, 360–61
(2012); see also Aamer Madhani, What Makes Cleric al-Awlaki So Dangerous; Terrorist Wears
Mask of Scholar, Knows His Foe, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 2010, at 1A (discussing al-Awlaki’s
career).
128
2011 EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 9; 2011 SIP, supra note 10.
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ments begin by positing that al Qaeda’s targeting of potential recruits
within the United States through various media is the relevant operational concern.129 According to Empowering Local Partners, targeting
recruits in this way is a threat not only because it increases the risk of a
terrorist attack directly, but also because it may “create a backlash”
(presumably, but not explicitly, against Muslim American communities) that “would feed al-Qa’ida’s [domestic] propaganda.”130 The
documents emphasize the state’s relative disadvantage, as compared
to communities, in identifying and speaking to recruiters’ targets in
ways that mitigate domestic-source violence.131 Neither document,
however, explores the identity of those being targeted for recruitment
by terrorists. On occasion, Empowering Local Partners mentions Muslim
Americans in particular, but these references are fleeting.132 (This
reticence has prompted accusations of “political[ ] correct[ness]”133
from critics on the political right.) The documents also make no distinction between extremist and moderate groups in the manner of the
Prevent strategy. Nor do they discuss the distinction, again important
to the development of U.K. policy, between theology and ideology.
The Empowering Local Partners documents nevertheless render the
state’s role with more precision than the 2011 NSC managed. They
speak of the federal government as “a facilitator, convener, and
source of information,” although they also note that it is “ill-suited to
intervene in the niches of society where radicalization to violence
takes place.”134 Precisely how the federal government serves these
roles, however, remains opaque. On the one hand, the government is
129
See 2011 EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 9, at 2–3 (“[A]l-Qa’ida and its
affiliates and adherents are openly and specifically inciting Americans to support or commit acts of violence—through videos, magazines, and online forums . . . .”); accord 2011
SIP, supra note 10, at 2.
130
2011 EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 9, at 2.
131
See id. at 3 (“Communities are best placed to recognize and confront the
threat . . . .”).
132
See, e.g., 2011 SIP, supra note 10, at 8 (“As President Obama emphasized, when
discussing Muslim Americans in the context of al-Qa’ida’s attempts to divide us, ‘we don’t
differentiate between them and us. It’s just us.’”).
133
Press Release, Rep. Peter T. King, Chairman, H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., Statement on Obama Administration Violent Extremism Strategy (Aug. 3, 2011), available at
http://homeland.house.gov/press-release/king-statement-obama-administration-violentextremism-strategy. There is some irony to this accusation given the Obama White
House’s consistent and conspicuous distancing of the President from Muslim Americans.
134
2011 EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 9, at 3; see also id. at 5 (“[The federal
government will] convene forums, develop brochures, respond to correspondence, [and]
post information on websites . . . .”); 2011 SIP, supra note 10, at 2 (envisaging “platforms
throughout the country for including communities that may be targeted by violent extremists”). For another federal authority echoing this theme, see Janet Napolitano, Partnering
with Communities to Counter Violent Extremism, BLOG @ HOMELAND SECURITY (Mar. 6, 2011,
3:45 PM), http://blog.dhs.gov/2011/03/partnering-with-communities-to-counter.html
(framing “countering violent extremism as both a ‘whole of government’ and ‘whole of
nation’ effort”).
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to “raise awareness about the threat of violent extremism,”135 intimating (perhaps oddly and counterfactually) a lack of awareness among
some Americans of al Qaeda’s persistence. On the other hand, the
White House stresses that Empowering Local Partners will produce information to be “shared with those assessed to need it.”136 This statement suggests that information will flow from the public to the
government as a result of Empowering Local Partners. Yet other strands
of the policy stand in some tension with notional goals of “mutual
trust, respect, and understanding.”137 For example, the federal government commits to “continue to closely monitor the important role
the internet and social networking sites play in advancing violent extremist narratives”—a nicely worded commitment that avoids an overt
admission of suspicionless or blanket surveillance of specific communications modalities, but which might be read to intimate precisely
that.138
The government has also left the precise modalities of policy delivery opaque. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for example, maintains that it is committed to “upholding and enhancing the
community’s trust [so as to allow] law enforcement [to] counter the
spread of this extremist ideology,”139 yet how it will do so is not specified. In Empowering Local Partners policy documents, historical and
contemporary models of community engagement employed respecting criminal gangs and schooling are touted as examples.140 But how
these examples are to be translated to the distinct, arguably more
fraught, context of counterterrorism is not clear at all. Moreover,
whereas the cited exemplars from existing programs are subject specific, the White House insists that it will not “narrowly build relationships around national security issues alone.”141 This statement
135

2011 SIP, supra note 10, at 8.
Id. at 2.
137
2011 EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 9, at 8.
138
Id. at 6.
139
Cf. Carol Dyer et al., Countering Violent Islamic Extremism: A Community Responsibility,
FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Dec. 2007, at 3, 8 (discussing Muslim and Arab Americans’
feelings that “government agents treat them as suspects and view all Muslims as
extremists”).
140
2011 EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 9, at 4. The comparison to antigang
programs is especially common. See DHS’s Approach to Countering Violent Extremism, DEP’T
HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/dhss-approach-countering-violent-extremism
(last visited Jan. 21, 2013) (announcing Department of Homeland Security (DHS) strategy
to combat terrorism by “strength[ening] . . . local communities”); see also Press Release,
Dep’t Homeland Security, Readout of Secretary Napolitano’s Remarks at the West Virginia
Homeland Security Summit (June 1, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1306
977568776.shtm (describing DHS efforts to “implement community-oriented policing
strategies”).
141
2011 EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 9, at 5; accord 2011 SIP, supra note
10, at 7 (arguing for “engage[ment] on the full range of community interests and
concerns”).
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suggests that the government will bundle Empowering Local Partners
with existing federal efforts. Yet in setting forth the interagency process to give effect to the policy, the White House allocates primary
responsibility to the National Counterterrorism Center, with an interagency task force largely comprised of security agencies.142 The policy
also builds on efforts by national security agencies, such as the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security.143 Finally,
it merits notice that much of the operational detail supplied in the
Empowering Local Partners documents might imply that the government
is focused on improving its internal stock of knowledge concerning
the psychological and social dynamics of terrorism instead of cultivating the social production of counterterrorism.144 If true, this would
render the relevant communities mere instruments in a larger strategy
that had little space for their interests and perspectives.
***
In summary, even if Empowering Local Partners has, to date, lacked
the detail—or the controversy—of the Prevent strategy, it nonetheless
shares two core assumptions with its British analog: first, that diffused
social action impacts the rate of terrorism, and second, that government can positively influence social action in order to lower net terrorist risk.145 At the same time, both policies are either silent or
opaque on two key questions. The most critical lacuna in Empowering
Local Partners, as in the Prevent strategy, is the absence of any robust
account of how social action causes security against terrorism. Precisely what the social role involves is unclear. I have argued above that
the policies’ focus on the comparative disadvantage of government in
the ideological domain is suggestive, rather than clarifying, of the social role. The second gap is the absence of any clear account of how
the state can elicit desirable public behaviors or how such efforts interact with other extant policies.
142
See 2011 SIP, supra note 10, at 3. In addition, the White House suggests that prevention efforts will follow through “current programs” given the “increased fiscal constraints.” Id. at 5.
143
See id. at 11–12. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy also identifies the
promotion of Muslim Americans’ civil rights and civil liberties as a potential tool in the kit.
See Carpenter et al., supra note 7, at 325.
144
Consistent with this concern, documents produced through Freedom of Information Act litigation filed by the American Civil Liberties Union suggest that the FBI views
and uses its program of community consultation as a mechanism for gathering information. See FOIA Documents Show FBI Illegally Collecting Intelligence Under Guise of “Community
Outreach,” AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/nationalsecurity/foia-documents-show-fbi-illegally-collecting-intelligence-under-guise-community.
145
See PREVENT STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 5–7; 2011 EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS,
supra note 9, at 2–3.
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COUNTERTERRORISM

This Part begins the task of developing potential causal foundations for the social production of counterterrorism. To motivate this
enterprise, I first develop examples from the counterterrorism domain and parallels in the crime control and counterinsurgency contexts to show how social action can mitigate risks of violence. The
central section of this Part—and indeed of this Article—posits three
mechanisms through which private behavior might in certain contexts
contribute to security. I label them ideological competition, ethical anchoring, and cooperative coproduction. In developing these mechanisms, my
aim is not to endorse any one as particularly important or efficacious,
but instead to offer arguments both for and against their efficacy.
The net result is a general framework for better determining whether
to credit the causal claims of the Prevent strategy and Empowering Local
Partners.
A. Counterterrorism’s Social Production on the Ground
To grasp the social role in counterterrorism, I begin with some
examples of the forms of private action that the Prevent strategy and
Empowering Local Partners might aim to elicit:
• In 2008, British police arrested a man named Isa Ibrahim
(né Andrew Philip), a convert to Islam, in Bristol, England, on the
basis of information from the city’s Muslim community.146 When
Ibrahim was arrested, he had in his home “two homemade suicide
vests, homemade explosives, a quantity of ball bearings and air gun
pellets.”147 Evidence also emerged that he had planned an attack
on a local mall.148 The detective superintendent leading the investigation stated, “[h]e was an unknown. Without the information
from the community we may not have got to him. Without the community’s help he could have killed dozens of people.”149 The Bristol incident is not the first in which a community-based tip has
induced British police to make a terrorism arrest.150
• In the United States, the voluntary provision of information
by a suspect’s coreligionists or peers has similarly catalyzed several
highly publicized terrorism investigations. The so-called Lack146
Steven Morris, Turned in by His Community, the Extremist Who Wanted to Belong,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), July 17, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/jul/17/isa-ibrahimprofile-muslim-community.
147
CONTEST: U.K.’S STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 68.
148
See Morris, supra note 146.
149
Id.; see also CONTEST: U.K.’S STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 68 (mentioning that
Ibrahim was arrested “after members of the Muslim community in [his town] alerted the
police”).
150
See, e.g., Tom Savage, “Bomb Plot” Five Banned by Mosque, DAILY STAR (U.K.), Dec. 22,
2010, at 13, available at 2010 WLNR 25214130.
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awanna Six investigation began when the FBI received a “handwritten missive” in June 2001 warning of al Qaeda efforts to “recruit[ ]
the Yemenite youth” in upstate New York.151 Lackawanna is not an
isolated example.152 In 2009, information from a Muslim community organization led to the arrests of five Virginia men who had
traveled to Pakistan allegedly seeking terrorism training.153 And in
2010, a “tip” from the local Muslim community led the FBI to investigate another Virginia resident, Farooque Ahmed, and later arrest
him based on his plan to commit attacks on the capitol’s public
transportation network.154 Additionally, another community tip led
to the arrest of a Portland, Oregon, Somali man for planning a carbomb attack.155
• In 2004, a Jamaican-born imam, Abdullah el-Faisal, was convicted in London of solicitation to murder and provocation of racial
hatred.156 El-Faisal had allegedly played a role in persuading one of
the four July 2005 attackers of London Underground trains and
buses to adopt violence for political ends.157 Yet a group of Brixton
Salafists had already brought el-Faisal’s propaganda in favor of terrorism to the attention of London police several years earlier.158
The police reaction had been to show “no real interest,”159 perhaps
because of the disfavor with which Salafists are typically viewed. At
the same time, the same Brixton Salafist group had attempted to
persuade the English-born Richard Reid to reject teachings that encouraged violence, but their efforts were unavailing.160
• In November 2009, a Nigerian businessman approached the
CIA station in Lagos to report concerns about his son’s “radicalization” in Yemen; the resulting report was filed and “largely forgot151

DINA TEMPLE-RASTON, THE JIHAD NEXT DOOR: THE LACKAWANNA SIX AND ROUGH
IN THE AGE OF TERROR 124–25 (2007).
152
For a list of instances in which community coreligionists or peers provided information that triggered investigations and arrests, see Editorial, Muslims Are Helping Thwart Terrorism, AUGUSTA CHRON., Mar. 16, 2011, at A8.
153
See Mark Guarino, Five Americans Arrested in Pakistan Don’t Fit Typical Profile, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 10, 2009, at 2.
154
See Alicia A. Caldwell & Matt Apuzzo, Subway Bomb Suspect Hoped to Be Martyr; Pakistani-Born Man Wanted to Go to Afghanistan to ‘Kill Americans,’ HOUS. CHRON., Oct. 29, 2010, at
A3.
155
See Bob Drogin & April Choi, Oregon Man, 19, Is Held in Plan to Bomb Tree-Lighting,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2010, at A1.
156
See R. v. El-Faisel, [2004] EWCA (Crim) 456, [3]–[9], [47]–[48] (Eng.).
157
See Alan Cowell, Britain Deports Man Accused of Ties to Attacker in ’05 Bombing, N.Y.
TIMES, May 26, 2007, at A7.
158
ROBERT LAMBERT, COUNTERING AL-QAEDA IN LONDON: POLICE AND MUSLIMS IN PARTNERSHIP 191 (2011) [hereinafter LAMBERT, COUNTERING AL-QAEDA] (quoting Abdul Haqq
Baker). Note that Brixton is a neighborhood in South London.
159
Id.
160
See id. at 205–06; accord Robert Lambert, Salafi and Islamist Londoners: Stigmatised
Minority Faith Communities Countering al-Qaida, ARCHES Q., Summer 2008, at 35, 40, available
at http://www.thecordobafoundation.com/attach/Arches_issue_02x_Web.pdf.
JUSTICE
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ten.”161 A month later, the son, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab,
boarded an Amsterdam-to-Detroit flight and attempted to detonate
a bomb while on board.162

In each of these examples, a nongovernmental actor with ties of some
sort to a potential or future terrorism suspect independently took an
action that mitigated the threat of terrorism without either priming or
prompting by the state. In each case, the fact of daily interaction endowed the relevant actor with an advantage in comparison to the government. The resulting intervention was not always a success—either
because it was not forceful enough or because the state failed to follow
through—but nonetheless made the terrorist act less likely. Hence,
these examples provide a basis for positing that the social production
of counterterrorism merits investigation.
B. Counterinsurgency and Crime Control Parallels
Beyond these suggestive anecdotes, parallels to analogous domains of policy, such as counterinsurgency and crime control, can
help develop foundations for crediting claims of a social role in
counterterrorism. Both counterinsurgency and crime control involve
state efforts to mitigate violence, and both suggest that social action
matters.
Consider first evidence from the counterinsurgency context. Because there are undeniably large differences between a foreign occupation and local policing, the theoretical basis of counterinsurgency
cannot be transposed mechanically into the domestic terrorism context.163 Nevertheless, it is instructive, if not dispositive, that even in
the counterinsurgency context—where the state possesses overwhelming and asymmetrical force—the government tends to rely on diffuse
social support to staunch terrorist-like violence.164 Recent counterinsurgency texts underscore the centrality of diffuse support in suppressing any insurgency.165 In a break from longstanding approaches
161
Karen DeYoung & Michael Leahy, Warning on Detroit Suspect Didn’t Rise Above the
‘Noise,’ WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 2009, at A1.
162
See Press Release, White House, White House Review Summary Regarding 12/25/
2009 Attempted Terrorist Attack (Jan. 7, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/white-house-review-summary-regarding-12252009-attempted-terroristattack.
163
See Ganesh Sitaraman, Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and the Laws of War, 95
VA. L. REV. 1745, 1771 (2009) (emphasizing the differences between counterinsurgency
and counterterrorism).
164
See THE U.S. ARMY & MARINE CORPS, COUNTERINSURGENCY FIELD MANUAL: U.S. ARMY
FIELD MANUAL NO. 3-24, MARINE CORPS WARFIGHTING PUBLICATION NO. 3-33.5, at xxv
(2007).
165
See id. (noting that “[t]he civilian population is . . . the deciding factor in the struggle,” with the key issue being the ability to secure their support); accord DAVID J. KILCULLEN,
COUNTERINSURGENCY 3–5 (2010).
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to war making, these texts propose that “the focus of counterinsurgency is building the population’s trust, confidence, and cooperation with the government,” in part through the use of “political, legal,
economic, and social reconstruction in order to develop a stable, orderly society, in which the population itself prevents the emergence or
success of the insurgency.”166 The relevant point here is not that the
same strategies should be used in the domestic terrorism context, but
that if the state does not have a monopoly on security production
under exigent circumstances and must instead rely on segments of the
population at large, it may also wield no monopoly in the domestic
counterterrorism domain.
Perhaps the closer analogy to the counterterrorism context,
though, is crime control. Political scientists, sociologists, and criminologists who study the problem of crime long ago concluded that
“[p]rivate actors have a pervasive role in crime prevention and control.”167 This kind of involvement is not simply a matter of private
precautions, such as installing fences and using locks.168 Rather, a
growing body of literature suggests that “the differential ability of
neighborhoods to realize the common values of residents and maintain effective social controls is a major source of neighborhood variation in violence”—particularly for homicide.169 In the leading
empirical works in this tradition, sociologist Robert Sampson has conceptualized and developed survey instruments to measure a quality he
and collaborators have termed “collective efficacy,” or “the linkage of
mutual trust and the shared willingness to intervene.”170 This quality
166

Sitaraman, supra note 163, at 1771.
Philip J. Cook & John MacDonald, The Role of Private Action in Controlling Crime, in
CONTROLLING CRIME: STRATEGIES AND TRADEOFFS 331, 331 (Philip J. Cook et al. eds., 2011).
168
Although this matters too. See id. at 337–44 (discussing the pros and cons of various kinds of private precautionary actions).
169
Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE 918, 918 (1997); see also Jeffrey D. Morenoff et al., Neighborhood
Inequality, Collective Efficacy, and the Spatial Dynamics of Urban Violence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 517,
551 (2001) (finding that measures of lower collective efficacy in a neighborhood independently predict increased homicide risk). See generally ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN
CITY: CHICAGO AND THE ENDURING NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT 149–78 (2012) [hereinafter
SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY] (describing the concept of collective efficacy); Robert J.
Sampson et al., Assessing “Neighborhood Effects”: Social Processes and New Directions in Research,
28 ANN. REV. SOC. 443, 457–65 (2002) [hereinafter Sampson, Assessing “Neighborhood Effects”] (same).
170
Robert J. Sampson, Neighborhood Effects, Causal Mechanisms and the Social Structure of
the City, in ANALYTICAL SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL MECHANISMS 227, 232 (Pierre Demeulenaere
ed., 2011) [hereinafter Sampson, Neighborhood Effects]. Similar findings have been reported
with respect to social capital, which is a slightly different concept in operation. See Daniel
Lederman et al., Violent Crime: Does Social Capital Matter?, 50 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL
CHANGE 509, 511 (2002) (“[T]he prevalence of trust on community members seems to
have a significant and robust effect of reducing the incidence of violent crimes.”); Richard
Rosenfeld et al., Social Capital and Homicide, 80 SOC. FORCES 283, 294 (2001)
(“[G]eographic areas with higher levels of social capital exhibit lower homicide rates.”).
167
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is an accumulation of behaviors and decisions by groups of private actors who interact independently of a state-initiated instrument or goal.
Collective efficacy is, as its name suggests, a characteristic of a specific
(in Sampson’s work, geographically defined)171 community, but it has
a statistically significant effect on individual-level outcomes related to
criminality.172 This research hence tends to demonstrate that “social
ties and social control help to lower neighborhood crime rates.”173
Furthermore, although larger socioeconomic forces from “racial and
economic exclusion” to immigration influence collective efficacy,
Sampson’s work shows that it is nonetheless independently causally
efficacious.174 That is, the conceptualization and empirical testing of
collective efficacy demonstrate that social context—as distinct from
either government action or individual decisions—can have a direct
and significant influence on the frequency of private violence quite
distinct from the array of broader socioeconomic and cultural forces
typically called upon to explain changes in crime levels.
The core of collective efficacy—that social context is a significant
causal predicate of socially valuable action—finds echoes and support
in many other contexts, including studies of electoral participation,175
protest movements such as the civil rights movement,176 and revolutionary actions such as the Paris Commune.177 These studies point
toward the social mechanisms beneath these events. Social networks
171
See Sampson, Assessing “Neighborhood Effects,” supra note 169, at 445 (noting the persistent use of geographic boundaries to define neighborhoods).
172
Sampson, Neighborhood Effects, supra note 170, at 236. For evidence that “neighborhoods remain a viable policy option to building allegiance to community,” see, for example, Mark A. Glaser et al., The Paradox Between Community and Self-Interest: Local Government,
Neighborhoods, and Media, 23 J. URB. AFF. 87, 100 (2001).
173
Charis E. Kubrin & Ronald Weitzer, New Directions in Social Disorganization Theory, 40
J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 374, 376 (2003) (citing Paul E. Bellair, Social Interaction and Community Crime: Examining the Importance of Neighbor Networks, 35 CRIMINOLOGY 677 (1997);
Delbert S. Elliott et al., The Effects of Neighborhood Disadvantage on Adolescent Development, 33 J.
RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 389 (1996); Fred E. Markowitz et al., Extending Social Disorganization
Theory: Modeling the Relationships Between Cohesion, Disorder, and Fear, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 293
(2001)); see also DAVID M. KENNEDY, DON’T SHOOT: ONE MAN, A STREET FELLOWSHIP, AND
THE END OF VIOLENCE IN INNER-CITY AMERICA 15 (2011) (“The core of the problem [of
crime-related violence], the key to the way out, lies in community . . . .”); Bellair, supra, at
697 (finding through an empirical study that “both frequent and infrequent social interaction among neighbors is important for establishing community controls” and thus mitigating crime risk).
174
SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY, supra note 169, at 154–55.
175
See Robert Huckfeldt, The Social Communication of Political Expertise, 45 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 425, 425 (2001); Scott D. McClurg, The Electoral Relevance of Political Talk: Examining
Disagreement and Expertise Effects in Social Networks on Political Participation, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI.
737, 737 (2006).
176
See DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY, 1930–1970, at 98–106 (2d ed. 1999) (exploring the role of churches, schools, and
the NAACP in the postwar Southern civil rights movement).
177
See Roger V. Gould, Multiple Networks and Mobilization in the Paris Commune, 1871, 56
AM. SOC. REV. 716, 716 (1991).
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not only facilitate political action directly by lowering collective action
costs178 but also “transmit direct influence, changing one’s interests in
and inherent motivations toward participation” in any collective action.179 As a result, whether an individual engages in a form of risky
conduct that is either socially undesirable or beneficial will turn often
on the contingencies of social context.180
Given the role of social action in fostering and mitigating other
forms of desirable or undesirable private behaviors, including violence, it would indeed be surprising if the political violence of the sort
that concerns policymakers today did not have a social etiology. At a
minimum, it seems at least worth taking seriously the possibility,
limned by Prevent and Empowering Local Partners, that social action can
affect the risk of other kinds of violence, such as harmful acts committed for political rather than personal reasons.
C. Positing a Causal Foundation for the Social Production of
Counterterrorism
The aim of this section is to develop a more detailed account of
the possible causal mechanisms that could underwrite a social role in
counterterrorism. Loosely drawing inspiration from the examples
with which this Part began, I identify three potential causal mechanisms, which I term ideological competition, ethical anchoring, and cooperative coproduction. To be clear, my modest claim is that these are
potential explanations for the effect of social action on terrorism risk—
I do not intend in this Article to estimate the magnitude of their effect
empirically, but instead to offer a framework that might be used to
orient later empirical investigations. Before developing those three
mechanisms, I first offer a more general overview of the questions
raised by connecting social action with the mitigation of terrorism
risk.
1. Social Action and Terrorism: Threshold Questions
Any causal account of counterterrorism’s social production can
profitably start from the intuition that the commission of terrorism
involves at least two kinds of costs.181 First, there are costs associated
178
179

See MCADAM, supra note 176, at 45–46.
David A. Siegel, Social Networks and Collective Action, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 122, 124

(2009).
180

See, e.g., id.
The following paragraph employs rational choice tools to model the commission of
terrorism. Cf. Robert Powell, Defending Against Terrorist Attacks with Limited Resources, 101
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 527, 527 (2007) (“[S]trategic actors do try to strike where the defense is
weak and the expected gains are high.”).
181
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with recruitment.182 At this stage, the terrorist organization seeks to
disseminate its ideas and maximize its exposure to an audience of potential followers.183 As a result, social action that constrains or impedes such dissemination is socially valuable. Second, there are costs
associated with the commission of terrorist attacks.184 Although matériel and personnel figure large at this second operational stage, many
of its attendant costs are likely to be associated with concealing a
planned attack and otherwise evading detection.185 Accordingly, in
this second stage, the organization seeks to minimize exposure of its
operations.186 And, correspondingly, social action that increases
transparency or that otherwise raises the probability of exposure and
detection is now desirable.
Even this simple taxonomy provides a useful insight: different
kinds of social action will be desirable in the production of
counterterrorism. Because the frequency of terrorist attacks will decrease as the cost of their commission rises,187 both promoting action
that drowns out terrorist organizations’ recruitment efforts and also
eliciting private behavior that renders operations more transparent
will be useful approaches.188 The social production of counterterrorism is thus plural and not unitary.
This analysis suggests that claims of a social role in counterterrorism can be reframed as questions about how private actors either raise
the cost of recruiting for terrorist organizations or impose transaction
costs on opacity. In general, responses to those questions entail a
“who” component and a “how” component. Consider first the “who”
182
Terrorist groups also bear costs associated with the mundane tasks of managing
complex organizations. For an insightful analysis of these costs, see Mariano-Florentino
Cuéllar, The Untold Story of Al Qaeda’s Administrative Law Dilemmas, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1302,
1354–56 (2007).
183
Indeed, terrorist attacks themselves constitute a form of marketing for terrorist
groups competing against other political organizations for the allegiances of a pool of
potential recruits. See MIA BLOOM, DYING TO KILL: THE ALLURE OF SUICIDE TERROR 43–44
(2005) (emphasizing the role of intergroup competition in the production of terrorism).
184
See Cuéllar, supra note 182, at 1326, 1345–47.
185
Cf. id. at 1332–33 (analogizing terrorist organizations to administrative bureaucracies and pointing out the need for management capabilities before action has taken
place).
186
Cf. id. at 1336 n.143 (discussing the parallels between terrorist organizations and
administrative agencies in terms of needing secrecy and security).
187
See Claude Berrebi & Darius Lakdawalla, How Does Terrorism Risk Vary Across Space
and Time? An Analysis Based on the Israeli Experience, 18 DEF. & PEACE ECON. 113, 130 (2007)
(reporting empirical evidence that suggests elasticity of attack frequency with respect to
cost).
188
This assumes the terrorist organization does not have substitutes available at a similar cost. Cf. Walter Enders & Todd Sandler, The Effectiveness of Antiterrorism Policies: A VectorAutoregression-Intervention Analysis, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 829, 842 (1993) (finding, for example, that “[m]etal detectors decreased skyjackings and threats but increased assassinations
and other kinds of hostage incidents not protected by the detectors”).
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question. Both the Prevent strategy and Empowering Local Partners are
(perhaps strategically) ambiguous about the identity of the causally
efficacious social actor. The development of the Prevent strategy has
been marked by debates about the role of extremists versus moderates—although neither term is defined—and the centrality vel non of
the British Muslim community.189 Empowering Local Partners is even
more opaque. White House policy documents focus on the “community” as a coherent efficacious social actor.190 But which community?191 The White House is careful not to identify a specific ethnic or
religious group as a privileged actor in the social production of terrorism.192 In discussing recruitment by the latter, it explains that
“[s]upporters . . . come from different socioeconomic backgrounds,
ethnic and religious communities,”193 which may be a touch disingenuous. All know that these programs are not rolled out for the whole
population. The track record of post-2001 counterterrorism plainly
evinces a heightened focus on individuals or groups perceived to be
Muslim or of an ethnicity (such as Arab or South Asian) that proxies
for a Muslim identity.194
By contrast, over the past four years, the Department of Homeland Security has “cut the number of personnel studying domestic terrorism unrelated to Islam, canceled numerous state and local law
enforcement briefings, and held up dissemination of nearly a dozen
reports on extremist groups” under pressure from politically conservative groups who object to any federal attention on right-wing militias.195 There is no reported indication that this approach to the
allocation of domestic counterterrorism resources has changed, even
in the wake of 2012 shootings at a Sikh gurdwara in Oak Creek, Wisconsin.196 Federal attention to domestic terrorism threats, in short, is
189

See supra text accompanying notes 100–13.
See, e.g., 2011 EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 9, at 2–3.
191
The puzzle of how to define “community” is an abiding one. See generally Stuart A.
Queen, What is a Community?, 1 J. SOC. FORCES 375 (1923) (investigating the essential characteristics of communities as distinguished from the cities or organizations which may
house communities).
192
See 2011 NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY, supra note 8, at 11 (“[T]he terrorist threat we face in the United States is multifaceted and cannot be . . . reduced to a
one-size-fits-all approach.”).
193
See 2011 EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 9, at 1.
194
See Aziz Huq, The New Counterterrorism: Investigating Terror, Investigating Muslims, in
LIBERTY UNDER ATTACK: RECLAIMING OUR FREEDOMS IN AN AGE OF TERROR 167, 168, 171–77
(Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 2007).
195
R. Jeffrey Smith, Homeland Security Department Curtails Home-Grown Terror Analysis,
WASH. POST, June 7, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/homeland-securitydepartment-curtails-home-grown-terror-analysis/2011/06/02/AGQEaDLH_story.html; see
Spencer Ackerman, DHS Crushed This Analyst for Warning About Far-Right Terror, WIRED
(Aug. 7, 2012, 5:04 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/08/dhs/all/.
196
At the time of this writing, there is some indication that Congress will hold hearings on hate crimes. See Chris Lisee, Faith and Rights Groups Call for Hate Crime Hearings,
190
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not a product of neutral analysis of past harms or objective indicia of
risk, but instead a function of political mobilization and lobbying.
Understood in this light, the continuing, apparently nearly exclusive,
focus on Muslim American groups is perhaps not so surprising.
The identification of the relevant social actor also implicitly assumes a theory of how social action produces national security.
Neither the American nor the British documents, though, provide a
clear description of the causal mechanism whereby private action
translates into diminution of a terrorist threat. Both policies aver or
imply that the social role has an ideological or a persuasive dimension. But what is it about terrorism that renders the state incapable of
pedagogical efficacy? Government, after all, expends funds on speech
with a clear viewpoint all the time. Think of antismoking campaigns,
particularly those focused on risks to others.197 And why should it be
assumed that substitute private speech would necessarily have a desirable effect? For example, the appeal of al Qaeda propaganda might
possibly lie in its countercultural aura.198 If that is so, the statements
of authoritative figures within families, religious organizations, or
larger community structures—as much as the pronouncements of the
state—may well have the perverse and undesirable effect of increasing
terrorism’s allure. Alternatively, partnerships with groups with marginal (or “extreme”) views might be harmful if, to borrow a particularly
colorful metaphor, such entities “provide[ ] the mood music to which
suicide bombers dance.”199 Quite apart from such perverse effects,
the private actors elicited to execute the social role in counterterrorism must be directed toward the appropriate groups within society.
For example, terrorist recruiters may target certain demographic
slices—men rather than women, or youth rather than older persons.
Another key question then is who among the wide range of conceiva-

WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-faith/faith-andrights-groups-call-for-hate-crime-hearings/2012/08/24/bd141642-ee27-11e1-b624-99dee4
9d8d67_story.html.
197
See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 561–64 (2005) (describing
the scope of permissible government viewpoint discrimination in its own speech). To be
sure, antismoking campaigns also might be less effectual than believed for reasons that
parallel those developed in this Article.
198
Accord Olivier Roy, Al Qaeda in the West as a Youth Movement: The Power of a Narrative
15–16 (MICROCON, Policy Working Paper No. 2, 2008) [hereinafter Roy, Al Qaeda as a
Youth Movement], available at http://www.microconflict.eu/publications/PWP2_OR.pdf; cf.
OLIVIER ROY, THE POLITICS OF CHAOS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 144–45 (Ros Schwartz trans.,
2008) (noting the possibility of increasing cycles of alienation among Muslim youth in
Europe).
199
QUILLIAM FOUND., PULLING TOGETHER TO DEFEAT TERROR 3 (2008), available at
http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/pullingtogether-to-defeat-terror.pdf.
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ble “community” actors is best positioned to reach, let alone persuade,
that specific demographic.200
And, if these puzzles are not sufficient, the question of motive
also looms large and remains unanswered: Why would voices from the
“community” who can oppose the al-Awlakis of the world expend time
and effort negating malignant external influences? What incentive do
these actors have to undertake such unpopular and likely burdensome tasks whose benefits—in the form of increased security—are dispersed across a wider society? In most instances, the presence of
uncaptured positive externalities will entail that the relevant activity
will occur at suboptimal levels (at least given certain common assumptions about the rationality of individual behavior). Consistent with
this concern about incentives, it is hard to infer anything about the
conditions under which individuals or organizations will expend either more or less effort on actions believed to mitigate the risk of
terrorism. By extension, it is unclear how governments can design
official policy to increase desirable forms of private action while decreasing undesirable forms. If policymakers have no account of why
changes in policy improve or degrade the social production of
counterterrorism, of course, they will not know whether and when to
intervene in socially desirable ways. But the anodyne encomiums to
“engagement” lacing Empowering Local Partners cast little or no light on
precisely how government intervention into autonomous social
processes either promotes or harms the social production of
counterterrorism.
2. Social Action and Terrorism: Three Potential Mechanisms
The balance of this Part offers a first cut at answers to those puzzles. More specifically, I identify three potential causal mechanisms
that might underwrite the social production of counterterrorism: ideological competition, ethical anchoring, and cooperative coproduction. The
first two would raise the cost to terrorists of transparency at the moment of recruiting; the last would raise the cost of opacity further
downstream. Further, I advance counterarguments against each proposed mechanism. The net result is a more specific framework for
empirical and theoretical consideration of the basic causal foundations of Prevent and Empowering Local Partners.

200
See LORENZO VIDINO, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, COUNTERING RADICALIZATION IN AMERICA:
LESSONS FROM EUROPE 6–9 (2010), available at http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR262
%20-%20Countering_Radicalization_in_America.pdf (describing debates on these
questions).
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a. Ideological Competition
“Ideological competition” is the possibility that social action can
raise the cost of terrorism by providing substitute forms of social solidarity and vehicles of collective political action. By more densely
populating the marketplace of ideas, ideological competition raises
terrorism’s propagandizing and recruitment costs.
The case of Richard Reid, sketched above, is useful as an example
of how ideological competition might work.201 Reid had longstanding
objections to American foreign policy decisions, and he had been
searching for a social milieu that endorsed those objections.202 In
very simplified terms, the London of the late 1990s offered Reid two
options that were consistent with his religious view: a group of quietist
Salafists in Brixton and the Jamaican-born imam Abdullah el-Faisal,
who endorsed the commission of violent actions to challenge U.S. foreign policy.203 Even though the former failed where the latter succeeded, Reid’s case is still consistent with the view that an absence of
alternative forms of political mobilization close to a potential recruit’s
ideal policy point lowers the expected costs of recruitment.
The ideological competition mechanism works through the disciplining effect of competition, which, as in many other domains, conduces to higher operating costs and smaller margins. A terrorist
organization seeking to attain certain policy goals or appealing on the
basis of particular points of foreign policy must compete in a “market
of social movements, both political and religious,” and the greater the
competition, the tougher its task.204 In the course of competing, the
organization will find that recruiting is more costly in circumstances
where other groups are pursuing the same policy goals, albeit without
violence. Those other groups may be more appealing because they
provide a vehicle for antiauthoritarian preferences without the severe
costs of social ostracism and legal sanctions that are attached to endorsement or pursuit of violence. All things being equal, it seems
plausible to think that the terrorist organization facing a more
crowded ideological marketplace will have to expend more of its limited resources in attracting recruits, leaving fewer resources for the
commission of violence.205
201

See supra text accompanying note 160.
See LAMBERT, COUNTERING AL-QAEDA, supra note 158, at 205–06.
203
See id. at 204–05. For a discussion of the influence of London’s so-called “sheikhs,”
see Barbieri & Klausen, supra note 63, at 421–23.
204
SCOTT ATRAN, TALKING TO THE ENEMY: FAITH, BROTHERHOOD, AND THE (UN)MAKING
OF TERRORISTS 471 (2010).
205
The effects of competition on terrorist organizations are also perceptible in two
other contexts. First, a similar kind of ideological competition to the one hypothesized in
the main text can be observed in a recent account of political struggles in the Palestinian
refugee camp of Ain al-Hilweh, where a violent Salafist group struggles for influence with
202

R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\98-3\CRN303.txt

unknown

Seq: 39

11-MAR-13

2013] THE SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

12:26

675

Competition may also be less effective when there is a larger
space between the ideal policy points of a terrorist organization and
its next closest competitor.206 This mechanism explains why a focus
on ideology, such as that found in the Prevent strategy and Empowering
Local Partners, is indeed warranted.207 But contrary to the current Prevent strategy’s aversion to “extremist” movements,208 this ideological
competition mechanism implies that having a plurality of ideologically
proximate alternatives to violent social movements is desirable because of the state’s comparative disadvantage as a platform for
countercultural, oppositional speech.209 Rather than denouncing
marginal political voices, the state might at least tolerate, if not cultivate, them for their net positive security externalities.
The uses of ideological competition have not escaped government attention. In the United Kingdom, the Special Branch of
London’s Metropolitan Police has created the Muslim Contact Unit
(MCU) for cultivating relations with the London Salafist and Islamist
communities, precisely in order to help them identify and dissuade
potential recruits to violence early.210 The MCU was established in
the days immediately after Richard Reid’s arrest as a way to “enter into
dialogue on a partnership footing” with Salafist and other politically
extreme groups as a way of ensuring that police did not “lose their
critical support in combating al-Qaeda’s established influence in the
capital.”211 Accounts of the MCU emphasize specific Salafist successes
in competing with al Qaeda proxies such as Abdullah el-Faisal212 and
Abu Hamza.213
nationalist and other groups. See BERNARD ROUGIER, EVERYDAY JIHAD: THE RISE OF MILITANT
ISLAM AMONG PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON 143–46 (2007). Second, some analysts have suggested that the fragmentation of al Qaeda could induce increased competition between
ensuing factions. See Clint Watts, What If There Is No Al-Qaeda? Preparing for Future Terrorism,
FOREIGN POL’Y RES. INST. (July 2012), http://www.fpri.org/enotes/2012/201207.watts.alqaeda.html.
206
See Bernard Haykel, Threat Level, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2011, at BR13 (discussing
Kurzman’s work, which notes that “al Qaeda faces competition from liberal Islamic
groups”).
207
See PREVENT STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 44; 2011 EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS,
supra note 9, at 3, 6–7.
208
See PREVENT STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 39.
209
See, e.g., KURZMAN, supra note 14, at 39–42 (“[T]he Tablighi Jamaat[—a group
sometimes criticized as a conveyer-belt organization—]may be seen as part of the crowded
ideological field that terrorists face as they compete for Muslims’ support.”).
210
See LAMBERT, COUNTERING AL-QAEDA, supra note 158, at 35–36, 57–62 (describing
the birth and early activities of the MCU).
211
Id. at 58–59.
212
See id. at 180–81 (describing how Brixton Salafists prevented el-Faisal from entering
and preaching in a local mosque).
213
Cf. id. at 148–49 (“[The Finsbury Park Islamists] reclaimed the notorious Finsbury
Park Mosque . . . from a bunch of dangerous thugs who brazenly supported and promoted
al-Qaeda ideology.”).
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Perhaps predictably, the MCU has been a controversial innovation, attacked for its perceived proximity to Salafists.214 Its critics
might contend more generally that ideological competition will have
predictable undesirable effects. Perhaps a plurality of private associations that share the liminal political views—but not the penchant for
violence—of terrorist organizations might instead hinder efforts to
minimize terrorism risk. As historical precedent, such critics might
invoke the development of violent splinter groups out of an Israeli
settler milieu that were at a remove from larger Israeli society in the
1980s.215 Echoing this concern, one critique of the Prevent strategy
and its ilk has been that some of the groups included therein operate
as “conveyer belt[s]” toward violent political action, even if such
groups themselves do not practice or espouse violence.216 Beyond
this enabling effect, an increase in the frequency of antiestablishment
messaging by quietist but politically radical organizations may have
the effect of legitimating terrorist organizations’ calls to arms. Again,
the fear has historical support. Recent sociological work on early
twentieth-century Italy, for example, has identified the mediating role
that cooperatives and mutual aid societies played in providing a platform for fascist parties.217
Nevertheless, many of the arguments lodged against the inclusion
of extremist but nonviolent groups within the scope of state efforts to
mitigate terrorism risk at minimum suffer from a causal attribution
problem in practice. Consider the “conveyor belt” metaphor, which
suggests that groups close to a terrorist organization in policy preferences (but not in the use of violence) have an undesirable causal effect on the development of terrorist recruits.218 The fact that
individuals move from a nonviolent but extreme organization to a violent organization seems to imply a causal effect. But the inference of
214
Cf. Vikram Dodd, List Sent to Terror Chief Is a Smear Tactic, Say Peaceful Islamic Groups,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Aug. 5, 2010, at 4 (describing accusations against a list of British Muslim
groups to be connected to terrorism that was prepared by the Quilliam Foundation, a
government-funded counterextremist think tank in the United Kingdom, for British officials). No doubt care must be taken in drawing inferences from allegations by one potential recipient of government funds against its competitors for state dollars.
215
See generally Ehud Sprinzak, From Messianic Pioneering to Vigilante Terrorism: The Case
of the Gush Emunim Underground, 10 J. STRATEGIC STUD. 194 (1987) (developing a history of
radicalization within Gush Emunim). I am grateful to Ben Wittes for drawing this example
to my attention.
216
See Carpenter et al., supra note 7, at 307–09; see also ANGEL RABASA ET AL., RAND
CORP., DERADICALIZING ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS 129 & n.21 (2010) (noting the possibility of
quietist but radical groups serving as either “conveyor belts” or “firewall[s]”); Marc Lynch,
Islam Divided Between Salafi-Jihad and the Ikhwan, 33 STUD. CONFLICT & TERRORISM 467, 468
(2010) (same).
217
Dylan Riley, Civic Associations and Authoritarian Regimes in Interwar Europe: Italy and
Spain in Comparative Perspective, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 288, 298–301 (2005) (presenting evidence
to this effect).
218
See Carpenter et al., supra note 7, at 307–08; Lynch, supra note 216, at 480.
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causation does not follow: those same individuals may have moved directly to terrorism in the absence of the nonviolent organization,
while other individuals who would have adopted terrorist means may
have chosen not to do so because they found an ideologically sympathetic environment. It is fallacious to reason from the mere casual
observation of individual migrations into terrorism to the conclusion
that extremist but nonviolent groups increase the rate of terrorism.
Moreover, the conveyer belt model assumes that quietist and
politicized extremist groups are ideological kith and kin.219 But this
may not be so: at least one comparative study identifies different indicators, including divergent readings of religious texts, between quietist and political Salafists.220
Further, the legitimating effect of ideological competition may
well vary between national, and even local and municipal, contexts.
Thus, in an otherwise diverse metropole such as London or New York,
the presence of one or two politically radical but quietist groups may
have little enabling or legitimating effects on terrorism, but they may
serve as effective ideological competitors for the small number of individuals attracted to terrorism.221 On the other hand, in the very different context of, say, a refugee camp milieu where there are many
radical groups, only some of which are violent, the legitimating and
enabling effects of ideological competition may well overwhelm any
ameliorative effect it has on terrorism rates.222
Ultimately, the net effect of ideological competition is an empirical question. The important conclusion here is that ideological competition is at least a plausible candidate mechanism through which
the social production of terrorism might work, even if its sign and
magnitude are likely to vary according to circumstance.
b. Ethical Anchoring
The second way social action can prevent a person from even
considering the possibility of violent political action is through the
“ethical anchoring” effect of close affiliations. This mechanism hinges
on the manner in which a network of friends, colleagues, and kin
members can impose social pressure on an individual to eschew the
use of violence for political ends.
219
See Lynch, supra note 216, at 480 (noting the emphasis conveyor-belt theorists place
on the ultimate goals of organizations rather than their means).
220
JAMIE BARTLETT ET AL., DEMOS, THE EDGE OF VIOLENCE 87–88, 97, 112–13 (2010),
available at http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Edge_of_Violence_-_full_-_web.pdf?129180
6916.
221
See id. at 118, 134 (raising the possibility that expressions of “radical views [are] a
healthy and natural part of airing issues”).
222
See, e.g., BLOOM, supra note 183, at 43–44 (pointing to intergroup competition as a
catalyst for the use of suicide terrorism).
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To see the possibility of ethical anchoring, consider the role of
parents and families in the example of the Nigerian suicide-bombermanqué recited above.223 Had Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab’s father
exercised effective suasion through his example and emotional proximity to his son, Abdulmutallab may never have had occasion to approach the Lagos CIA station. Less hypothetically, 19-year-old Somali
American Mohamed Osman Mohamud, who was alleged to have
planned a car-bomb attack against public holiday celebrations in Portland, Oregon, later acknowledged that his “parents . . . held [him]
back from jihad in the cause of Allah,” at least until they divorced,
leaving him to drift toward violence.224 These examples point to the
importance of strong, normatively informed social ties, or ethical
anchoring, in the mitigation of terrorism risk. Stated more generally,
political violence necessitates the violation of generally shared ethical
commitments,225 which in turn can lead to breaches with otherwise
close members of familial and social networks. To the extent that
members of tight social networks reiterate and reinforce those ethical
norms, with the implicit threat of ostracism and social sanction in the
background, recruitment costs will be higher. And to the extent that
these networks furnish affirmative role models, individuals will feel
less need to seek out violent forms of social action in the first place.226
The basic idea of ethical anchoring—that informal, social sanctions can impose a frictional barrier to illegal behavior—has a kinship
with, and might be justified by analogy to, the concept of collective
efficacy.227 Studies of the latter identify a positive correlation between
effective social ties within a given community and the reduction of
criminal violence.228 If “community-level variations in social control
contribute to varying crime rates,”229 then it stands to reason that such
variations could also induce reductions in other forms of violence.
223

See supra notes 161–62 and accompanying text.
FAWAZ A. GERGES, THE RISE AND FALL OF AL-QAEDA 161–63 (2011). To be clear, in
both cases there was a potentially significant failure of ethical anchoring.
225
See Huq, Signaling Function, supra note 69, at 883–85 (exploring the collective action issue of ethical impediments to committing terrorism).
226
Anwar al-Awlaki’s popularity has been explained in terms of his functioning as a
role model. See Jarret M. Brachman & Alix N. Levine, You Too Can Be Awlaki!, FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF., Winter 2011, at 25, 29–31 (“Youth who are seeking role models need someone who is easier to emulate, a figure that they can become without too much work or
thought, and who makes them feel as if they are producing something meaningful and
relevant.”).
227
See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN
CRIME CONTROL 174 (1973) (“Official actions can set off societal reactions that may provide
potential offenders with more reason to avoid conviction than the officially imposed unpleasantness of punishment.” (emphasis omitted)). For a survey of related empirical studies, see Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, Perceptual Research on General Deterrence: A
Critical Review, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 545, 549–53 (1986).
228
See supra text accompanying notes 169–74.
229
SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY, supra note 169, at 150 (emphasis omitted).
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“[I]nformal control strategies [for criminal violence] include the
monitoring of . . . play groups among children, sharing information
about other children’s behavior, willingness to intervene in preventing acts such as truancy . . . , and doing something about persons who
are exploiting or disturbing public space,”230 and there may be parallel informal control strategies that dampen the success of terrorist recruitment efforts. Specific analogies might include the regulation of
discussions in shared religious spaces, the expulsion of itinerant
agents of radicalization,231 and the promotion of more constructive
forms of opposition to disfavored national policies. In these ways, ethical anchoring can impede terrorist organizations from developing
the social networks that may otherwise have proven critical in radical
organizations’ efforts to reach potential recruits.232 By contrast, as
studies of private vigilantism in Israeli settler communities have
demonstrated, support for political violence within a social cohort
likely increases positive evaluations of such violence.233
Case studies of disengagement from terrorist groups support the
extension of collective efficacy theory mutatis mutandi to the terrorism
context. A recent series of such case studies of individuals who have
left terrorist groups, for example, emphasizes the “role of civil society”
in promoting “psychological disengagement.”234 Those studies suggest that even individuals who appeared to be committed to a terrorist
organization could be swayed, but that “people generally tend to be
more trusting of the communicator if they do not perceive that the
communicator has something to gain or has the explicit intention to
persuade.”235 For obvious reasons, this list of qualifications rules out
the state as an effective anchoring voice. The same study found that
interlocutors who are similar in social background, but older and per230

Id. at 152.
In the well-known Lackawanna Six case, the radical preacher responsible for catalyzing the alleged conspiracy had to seek permission from community “elders” when he
first began preaching. Cf. TEMPLE-RASTON, supra note 151, at 86 (“[I]t didn’t take much
convincing to get the elders to agree.”).
232
See FARHAD KHOSROKHAVAR, INSIDE JIHADISM: UNDERSTANDING JIHADI MOVEMENTS
WORLDWIDE 9–10 (2009) (noting evidence that “Jihadist cells are formed in relation to ties
of family, friendship, local residence, and kinship relations”); Max Taylor & John Horgan,
A Conceptual Framework for Addressing Psychological Process in the Development of the Terrorist, 18
TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 585, 589–91, 597 (2006) (noting the importance of group
context and emphasizing gradual socialization into committing terrorist acts); cf. QUINTAN
WIKTOROWICZ, RADICAL ISLAM RISING: MUSLIM EXTREMISM IN THE WEST 14–15 (2005)
(describing the importance of social networks to recruitment for Islamist groups).
233
See David Weisburd, Jewish Settler Violence: Deviance as Social Reaction 91–92
(1989).
234
JOHN HORGAN, WALKING AWAY FROM TERRORISM: ACCOUNTS OF DISENGAGEMENT
FROM RADICAL AND EXTREMIST MOVEMENTS 149–50 (2009). Care must be taken in drawing
inferences from these studies, however, since they involve only small samples.
235
Id. at 149.
231
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ceived as “experience[d],” are also likely to be effective.236 Such
voices are most likely to be drawn from the immediate social context
in which a potential recruit to or potential defector from a terrorist
organization is already embedded.
Rather than creating substitutes for violent political mobilization,
ethical anchoring depends on the extant presence of close, strong
ties, the rupturing of which an individual will perceive as a cost.237
Determining whether the same agent can accomplish both tasks
presents an empirical challenge. On one view, groups with politically
and religious moderate views are in the best position to engage in
ethical anchoring. Hence, the Singapore government works with an
association of mainstream Islamic scholars, Pergas, in a reportedly successful effort to “discredit radical Islamism.”238 On the other hand,
politically radical groups may have more credibility to engage in ethical anchoring with respect to political violence, if not other policy issues.239 For example, a lauded example of ethical anchoring is the
Active Change Foundation (ACF) in North London, founded by a former al Qaeda sympathizer, which “encourages youth to express their
rage about the mistreatment of Muslims in Iraq, Palestine, and elsewhere and channel it into peaceful political action.”240 ACF also provides social services and engages in outreach, in part to identify those
vulnerable to al Qaeda recruitment efforts, and then holds “targeted
intervention[s]” to challenge that process.241 Another survey of quietist Islamist groups in the West found that members of those groups
had actively discouraged individuals from terrorism and “personally
counselled young people against fighting overseas.”242
Private disapprobation and informal social restraints arguably already play a significant role in determining the relative infrequency of
domestic terrorism related to al Qaeda. Sociologist Charles Kurzman
has developed the most elaborate argument to this effect, positing
that al Qaeda efforts to persuade coreligionists in the United States
have been almost wholly unavailing.243 Somewhere between
236

See id.
Notice that this is in contrast to the “weak” ties employed in the ideological competition mechanism. Cf. Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 1 SOC. THEORY 201, 201, 207 (1983) (explaining the distinction between strong and
weak ties).
238
RABASA ET AL., supra note 216, at 100.
239
For an example of this kind of ethical anchoring among Egyptian Islamists, see
Peter Bergen & Paul Cruickshank, The Unraveling: Al Qaeda’s Revolt Against Bin Laden, NEW
REPUBLIC, June 11, 2008, at 16, 18 (describing the repudiation of al Qaeda by Sayyid Imam
Al Sharif, the organization’s “ideological godfather”).
240
Jessica Stern, Mind over Martyr: How to Deradicalize Islamist Extremists, 89 FOREIGN AFF.
95, 107–08 (2010). See generally RABASA ET AL., supra note 216, at 133–36 (describing ACF).
241
See RABASA ET AL., supra note 216, at 133–34.
242
BARTLETT ET AL., supra note 220, at 120–21.
243
See KURZMAN, supra note 14, at 13–14.
237
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1,100,000 to 7,000,000 Muslim Americans reside in the United
States.244 Yet, “in the five years after 9/11,” notes Kurzman, “fewer
than 40 Muslim-Americans planned or carried out acts of domestic
terrorism.”245 If “the number of disrupted plots is relatively small—
fewer than 200 Muslim-Americans have been involved in violent plots
since 9/11, most of them overseas— . . . credit for the low level of
violence must be due primarily to the millions of Muslims who have
refrained from answering the call to terrorism.”246 Had al Qaeda
been able to increase this tenfold, it would have added another 1,800
recruits to its ranks, but still left unmoved 99.9998 percent of American Muslims. According to Kurzman, the brute fact that absolute
levels of observed domestic-source terrorism attacks are not orders of
magnitude larger, as they would be were al Qaeda recruitment more
effective, suggests that the low rate of successful terrorist recruitment—and not any sort of state action—has independently produced
much security after 9/11.247
To be sure, there are also reasons to doubt the efficacy of ideological anchoring. A counterargument would begin with French sociologist Olivier Roy’s observation that recent Islamist terrorism has
been a countercultural movement animated by individuals’ desires to
position themselves in opposition to the political and cultural mainstream.248 Ethical anchoring by family or community leaders will by
hypothesis fail because “most of the radicals have broken with their
families or become estranged.”249 Terrorism is “a revolt not only
against the new world that offers only dead-end jobs and discrimination but also against the folk Islam of the old world.”250 State efforts
to consult with official representatives of a Muslim community may
accordingly have the effect of legitimating more radical voices.251
244
STREAM

See PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: MIDDLE CLASS AND MOSTLY MAIN9–13 (2007), available at http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.

pdf.
245

KURZMAN, supra note 14, at 13.
Id. at 14.
247
Notice that these proportions, as well as the inferred importance of ethical anchoring, have significance for the doctrinal question of whether counterterrorism measures
that focus on race or religion are closely tailored to further the compelling goal of promoting security.
248
See Roy, Al Qaeda as a Youth Movement, supra note 198, at 15–18 (describing al
Qaeda as a “youth movement” akin to the now-defunct Red Brigades); accord OLIVIER ROY,
GLOBALIZED ISLAM: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW UMMAH 43 (2004) (“The real genesis of Al
Qaeda violence has more to do with a Western tradition of individual and pessimistic revolt
for an elusive ideal world than with the Koranic conception of martyrdom.”).
249
Roy, Al Qaeda as a Youth Movement, supra note 198, at 15.
250
ROBERT S. LEIKEN, EUROPE’S ANGRY MUSLIMS: THE REVOLT OF THE SECOND GENERATION 75 (2012).
251
For an argument that this has happened in France and elsewhere in Europe, see
JONATHAN LAURENCE, THE EMANCIPATION OF EUROPE’S MUSLIMS: THE STATE’S ROLE IN MI-
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Worse, such efforts may have the perverse effect of increasing the allure of terrorism as a countercultural act.
Alternatively, the relatively low incidence of al Qaeda–inspired
terrorism in the United States may be a result not of collective efficacy
among Muslim Americans but of effective policing along traditional
lines. On this view, a specter of state retaliation, not the ethical restraints immanent in private ordering, is central to the production of
public safety.252
The force of such criticisms, of course, turns on empirical evaluations. It is necessary first of all to be able to measure the net restraining or motivating effect of collective efficacy against terrorism.
And second, any evaluation must account for the proportion of those
targeted for terrorist recruitment that reject political violence on
shared normative or ethical grounds versus the proportion that are
dissuaded by the threat of state force. On both points, there is some
reason to believe the evidence supports claims on behalf of ethical
anchoring.
First, Roy’s argument that al Qaeda appeals to countercultural
instincts does not contradict the possibility of ethical anchoring. The
appeal of al Qaeda among its European recruits may lie in its
countercultural flavor, but stronger social networks may nonetheless
reduce the volume of individuals seeking countercultural options in
the first instance. Second, the available evidence suggests that the failure of terrorist recruitment, not the success of criminal deterrence,
has produced a relatively low rate of post-9/11 attacks. On the one
hand, an August 2011 Gallup poll found that Muslim Americans were
more likely than any other faith group to reject the use of violence
against civilians either by states’ armies or terrorist groups, with 89
percent of those polled categorically rejecting the use of terrorist violence.253 On the other hand, an alternative explanation relying on
the deterrent effect of counterterrorism criminal laws would have to
explain why harsh penalties in other regimes, such as the antinarcotictrafficking laws, have failed to produce consistent deterrence. Although I develop more general reasons to be skeptical of deterrence
NORITY INTEGRATION

221–23 (2012) (describing consultative efforts of the French and Italian governments and the reactions they engendered).
252
I am again grateful to Steve Schulhofer for pressing this point in correspondence.
253
ABU DHABI GALLUP CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: FAITH, FREEDOM, AND THE FUTURE:
EXAMINING U.S. MUSLIMS’ POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND SPIRITUAL ENGAGEMENT 10 YEARS AFTER
SEPTEMBER 11, at 30–31 (2011), available at http://www.gallup.com/se/148805/MuslimAmericans-Faith-Freedom-Future.aspx; accord PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 244, at 49–56
(describing similar results). It is possible to argue that the Gallup and Pew results merely
reflect Muslim Americans’ comparatively greater unwillingness to voice support for terrorist violence. But if individuals are unwilling to even voice such support in the context of a
confidential survey, it seems very unlikely that they would be willing to act publicly, at the
risk of life and liberty, to vindicate the same view.
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explanations below, it suffices here to say that such accounts fail to
explain the observed attitudes of Muslim Americans and fit poorly
with observed experience in other fields of social control.
In sum, the value of ethical anchoring, like the value of ideological competition, is at bottom an empirical question. Nevertheless, I
tentatively suggest that there is at least some initial ground to believe
the mechanism is an effectual one.
c. Cooperative Coproduction
The idea of “cooperative coproduction” focuses on the manner
in which private individuals can substitute more fine-grained epistemic instruments for the blunter investigative methods government
otherwise employs. Whereas ideological competition and ethical
anchoring raise terrorist organizations’ front-end recruitment costs by
increasing the price of effective publicity, this third kind of social action against counterterrorism is valuable because it increases the cost
of opacity during the period in which a terrorist group seeks to render
its activities immune from public, and in particular official, scrutiny.
In both the Abdulmutallab and Ibrahim cases,254 for example, persons
with close knowledge of an alleged terrorism suspect leveraged their
epistemically privileged positions by providing information to law enforcement. In the first of these cases, the sheer volume of information
gathered by the U.S. government meant that it did not act upon the
lead.255 That lives were not lost was not a result of official action but
of the bravery and quick thinking of private actors.256 In the second
instance, U.K. police were able to take timely action, potentially saving
many lives.257 These examples, in addition to the other cases listed at
the beginning of this Part, suggest that the public’s advantage over
government is not merely ideological, but also epistemic.
The argument on behalf of a community epistemic advantage
proceeds as follows. Almost inevitably, members of the public will be
better able than the state to interpret ambiguous and fragmentary social cues from otherwise scattered and disconnected individuals.258
Even if the state can develop an extensive and deep system of intelligence collection through electronic surveillance, data mining, undercover agents, and paid informants, it is still unclear whether these
sources can gain the same epistemic competences in situating
254

See supra notes 146–49, 161–62 and accompanying text.
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
256
See Press Release, White House Review Summary Regarding 12/25/2009 Attempted
Terrorist Attack, supra note 162, at 1 (“The flight crew restrained Mr. Abdulmutallab and
the plane safely landed.”).
257
See Morris, supra note 146.
258
The same will often also be true for crime. See Cook & MacDonald, supra note 167,
at 346.
255
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nuanced social actions in their context.259 Arguably, neither technology nor infiltration wholly solves the problem of contextual interpretation, for neither is as sensitive to the nuances and subtleties of social
interaction as the immediate cadre of a person’s peers and coreligionists. Moreover, it is also not enough to posit that confidential informants can serve as substitutes. Informants are most often recruited
from outside a given community, and the available case studies of the
behavior of federal informants suggest they do not operate with a detailed knowledge of the relevant community. Instead, they tend to
target the psychologically vulnerable or immature in order to ensure a
continued revenue stream from their government employer.260 In
some cases, alleged terrorist conspiracies seem to be as much the
product of an informant’s perfervid imagination as a suspected terrorist’s intentions.261 Hence, even if informants can solve the epistemic
problem that terrorism investigators face, practical experience suggests they do so only at the cost of introducing a new source of distorting bias into counterterrorism policing efforts.
Cooperative coproduction, like ethical anchoring, may be more
significant in determining the present rate of terrorism incidents than
is generally recognized.262 At the moment, few details are available
about the extent to which police rely on information voluntarily supplied by members of the public. This is hardly surprising. Federal
and state law enforcement have little incentive to portray terrorismrelated arrests as the result of unilateral private action as opposed to
skilled police work, if only because they must be mindful of maintaining their future funding streams. Nevertheless, a recent study of terrorism-related prosecutions as reported by the FBI asserts that 48 of
161 arrests involving Muslim Americans involved “initial information”
that came to law enforcement via “tips from the Muslim-American
259
One reason for the state’s particular epistemic disadvantage in this context is the
role of religious speech and the longstanding absence of deep reservoirs of religious
knowledge in American government. See Huq, Signaling Function, supra note 69, at 870–71.
260
See, e.g., Wadie E. Said, The Terrorist Informant, 85 WASH. L. REV. 687, 715–22 (2010)
(discussing the questionable basis of several informant-triggered prosecutions). For detailed case studies regarding federal informants, see Petra Bartosiewicz, The FBI Stings Muslims, NATION, July 2/9, 2012, at 17, available at http://www.thenation.com/article/168380/
deploying-informants-fbi-stings-muslims; Petra Bartosiewicz, To Catch a Terrorist: The FBI
Hunts for the Enemy Within, HARPER’S MAG., Aug. 2011, at 37.
261
See Said, supra note 260, at 715–32 (providing a detailed history of several federalinformant-based cases); Robin Shulman, The Informer: Behind the Scenes, or Setting the Stage?,
WASH. POST, May 29, 2007, at C1 (canvassing similar doubts about informant usage).
262
Following Elinor Ostrom’s terminology, Samuel Rascoff has labeled this the
“coproduction of intelligence” to draw attention to the cooperative nature of the enterprise. See Samuel J. Rascoff, The Law of Homegrown (Counter)Terrorism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1715,
1720 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). I use Ostrom’s terminology to refer to
this most state-centered of the three mechanisms. I also use the term to belie any inference that “self-help” on the part of community members is desirable.
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community.”263 Although ascertaining how accurate this snapshot assessment is in global terms is difficult, the study provides a threshold
reason to believe that cooperation with law enforcement is in practice
often a first, rather than last, resort in the United States.
The obvious objection to the possible employment of cooperative
coproduction is that the technological prowess and deep human resources available to local and federal police have rendered it obselete.
What law enforcement cannot glean by trawling the Internet and
other communication channels, they can gain by employing confidential informants or covert infiltration. But the trajectory of the
Abdulmutallab case may also imply that the allure of technological
fixes can foster hazardous complaisance given the state’s highly constrained ability to process and accurately interpret data about the social landscape. Further, cooperative coproduction may have fewer
costs than the alternatives. At the very least, “an approach that
promises to reduce groups’ and individuals’ motivation to pursue violence and to discourage potential recruits from joining terrorism-using groups in the first place may seem superior in the long run to an
approach that aims to foil plans for specific acts of violence” on pure
fiscal and efficiency grounds.264 Further, cultivation of voluntary cooperation implicates fewer of the nettlesome legal and constitutional
questions that arise from aggressive homeland use of electronic surveillance and human sources.265 This is not to say that cooperative
coproduction cannot be criticized on ethical grounds—indeed, the
following Part develops some such criticisms—but rather that the
magnitude of the concerns implicated by its cultivation may be less
than for its most obvious substitutes.
***
This section has aimed to move beyond the generic and unhelpful formulations of official documents by specifying three causal
pathways through which private behavior yields the social good of national security. To that end, I have suggested that terrorist organiza263
See CHARLES KURZMAN, TRIANGLE CTR. ON TERRORISM & HOMELAND SEC., MUSLIMAMERICAN TERRORISM SINCE 9/11: AN ACCOUNTING 5 (2011), available at http://tcths.
sanford.duke.edu/about/documents/Kurzman_Muslim-American_Terrorism_Since_911_
An_Accounting.pdf. Note that this study contains no coding protocol and uses ambiguous
categories such as “tips” and “initial information.” See id.
264
Kruglanski et al., supra note 60, at 99.
265
For example, the targeting of a distinct ethnic or religious group for heightened
burdens on the basis of the criminal actions of a small subset therefore raises significant,
and likely fatal, constitutional concerns. Cf. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v.
Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 728 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Just as the government may
not segregate people on account of their race, so too it may not segregate on the basis of
religion. The danger of stigma and stirred animosities is no less acute for religious linedrawing than for racial.”).
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tions seek publicity or opacity depending on whether they are
recruiting or planning attacks. Social action matters when it renders
recruiting more costly and operations more expensive. Ideological competition, ethical anchoring, and cooperative coproduction are three causal
vectors through which private action potentially generates security
against terrorism. The first two work by raising the cost of recruitment, and the third works by increasing the price of violent action.
To reiterate, my aim in this Article is not to prove definitively that
any one of these mechanisms is necessarily efficacious. Rather, I have
developed both reasons to credit and discount each mechanism in an
effort to limn a framework for analyzing policies such as Prevent and
Empowering Local Partners. Nevertheless, my tentative view on balance
is that the mechanisms are plausible, such that governments should
make some effort to investigate and even to promote the social production of counterterrorism.

HOW DOES

III
STATE ELICIT COUNTERTERRORISM’S
SOCIAL PRODUCTION?

THE

Even assuming that the causal mechanisms limned in Part II are
fruitful, how should the state go about promoting them? Is there a
theoretical framework to guide state actions and investments aimed at
promoting the social production of counterterrorism? That both the
Prevent and Empowering Local Partners documents266 lack any clear account of how state action influences the social production of
counterterrorism in either positive or negative ways points toward yet
another large gap in existing policy analysis: States have not considered in public how efforts to promote beneficial social action would in
practice work. Moreover, they seem not to have seriously reflected on
how efforts to promote counterterrorism’s social production might interact with other security-related policies. Any government’s security
strategy has numerous elements, including a policing function and an
expressive function. At times, these may work at cross-purposes to
each other. Without a clear understanding of potentially complex interaction effects, it is hard to see how to optimize overall policy.
To begin answering these questions, this Part moves outside the
literature on national security to identify a theoretical basis upon
which state interventions might be designed. Its primary aim is not to
determine specific policies the state might adopt, but rather to develop a general account of mechanisms the state might use to elicit
desirable social action. This Part begins by drawing on two widely
credited accounts of how the state elicits socially valuable private con266

See supra Part I.C.
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duct developed in the context of criminal law: deterrence theory and
legitimacy theory. Drawing some concededly selective lessons from
both of these bodies of theory, I then identify a series of threshold
problems the state ought to consider when designing policies to foster
the social production of counterterrorism.
Again, a threshold caveat is warranted. This Part focuses largely
on only one of the three mechanisms developed in Part II: cooperative coproduction. This emphasis is warranted because the need to
find ways to promote desirable social action is likely greater in respect
to cooperative coproduction than for the other posited mechanisms
for three reasons. First, individuals already obtain large benefits from
the diverse weak and strong social ties implied by the ideological competition and ethical anchoring mechanisms.267 As a result, there is
less reason to be concerned about their underproduction. Second, a
government may not be able to do much in the short term to remedy
the absence of civil society, especially if it acts under the banner of
national security.268 Hence, discussion of the state’s role in this domain is necessarily abbreviated.
Third, there are freestanding reasons to believe that cooperation
with the state will occur at deficient levels. In particular, cooperation
in counterterrorism efforts involves undertaking some risks to self and
imposes harm on others. At a minimum, reporting suspicions of terrorism is quite unlike reporting other crimes, which insurance companies may require or which may be motivated by the prospect of
recovering stolen property.269 More generally, there are particularly
steep “private costs of reporting and cooperating with an investigation” quite beyond the sheer time they take.270 These costs range
from concerns about immigration status to unrelated illicit activities,
both of which might be inadvertently aired through contact with police. It is also important to recognize the “general distrust or disaffection of the police, coupled with a ‘no snitching’ norm,” that prevails
in many American and British Muslim communities as a consequence

267
On the general benefits of a robust civil society, see generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM,
BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMUNITY 19 (2000) (defining
civil society as “social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise
from them” and calling for renewed investments in its production); THE NAT’L COMM’N ON
CIVIC RENEWAL, A NATION OF SPECTATORS: HOW CIVIC DISENGAGEMENT WEAKENS AMERICA
AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT, at i (1998) (“gathering and assessing information and
advice” regarding a believed “period of pervasive moral decline”).
268
For instance, Robert Putnam’s work suggests that changes in levels of social capital
are largely generational. See PUTNAM, supra note 267, at 241–54.
269
See Cook & MacDonald, supra note 167, at 349.
270
Id.
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of past policing practices.271 Further, the potential costs to cooperation are likely to be more acute in the terrorism context than in the
crime control context. To cooperate with police in a counterterrorism matter is to create the possibility that the suspected target—who is
likely to be a member of one’s cohort or social milieu—will be subject
to an especially onerous kind of investigation. As criminologists observed long ago, the duration and uncertainty of the American criminal process can sometimes make “the process . . . the punishment.”272
Something somewhat akin to this “process as punishment” effect is
likely present in an amplified form in the national security domain,
where the social sanctions triggered by mere suspicion are an order of
magnitude greater than in the criminal domain.273
With that in mind, I turn first briefly to two general accounts of
how the state can elicit desirable private action before developing, in a
more granular fashion, some potential sticking points in policy
development.
A. Deterrence Theory
Anglo-American thinking about state responses to private violence is dominated presently by deterrence, “a social psychological
theory of threat communication in which the causal chain runs from
the objective properties of punishment through the perceptual
properties of punishment to crime.”274 Rather than turning on the
actual expenditure of state resources and effort, deterrence theory focuses on the way perceptions of the state’s expected actions influence
private behavior.275 Although the magnitude of deterrence effects

271
Id.; see also Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645, 690–92 (2004) (arguing that there are psychological harms
attached to serving as a police informant).
272
The phrase is drawn from MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT:
HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 199–243 (1979), which focuses on the distinct context in which pretrial process imposes large costs in relation to trivial postconviction sanctions. I adopt the phrase but use it in a different sense.
273
See Aziz Z. Huq, Forum Choice for Terrorism Suspects, 61 DUKE L.J. 1415, 1475–76
(2012) [hereinafter Huq, Forum Choice] (extending the “process as punishment” point to
the national security context).
274
Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?, 100 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 785 (2010).
275
See id. at 780; accord JACK P. GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT, AND DETERRENCE 175
(1975). In contrast to Gibbs’s path-marking work in sociology, the seminal economic text
on deterrence did not address the role of perception in deterrence theory. See generally
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968)
(discussing deterrence theory and the optimal levels of enforcement in terms of cost, nature of punishment, and changes in environment).
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turns on both the certainty and severity of state action,276 certainty has
long been thought to have a higher coefficient than severity.277
Deterrence theory provides a mechanism to connect state action
to the minimization of certain kinds of private behavior; it is typically
about prohibitions, not permissions. The theory thus requires surgery
if employed in the service of promoting specific desired private behaviors.278 To achieve that end, deterrence theory mutatis mutandi instructs the state to impose sanctions on the failure to engage in
socially beneficial behavior that amplifies collective security.279 Two
kinds of deterrence are relevant. First, the state might achieve deterrence by penalizing individual failures to cooperate, such as the intentional decision not to report suspicious information. Individualized
reporting obligations already exist in the financial sector,280 but they
might be extended to the general populace. Second, a number of
commentators writing post-9/11 have identified the possibility of securing collective deterrence by threatening to impose a sanction on
the group from which a terrorist organization attempts to recruit if
such recruitment efforts are successful.281 One group of commentators has also suggested that the state could impose penalties on a
whole group in the event of a successful attack by one of its members,
either on the theory that the members of the group are passive supporters of terrorism or that they “are in [a] better position to deter
terrorism [than the state] and fail[ed] to do so.”282
276
See Paternoster, supra note 274, at 783; accord Daniel S. Nagin, Criminal Deterrence
Research at the Outset of the Twenty-First Century, 23 CRIME & JUST. 1, 7 (1998).
277
For a leading empirical test, see Daniel S. Nagin & Greg Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence: Theory and
Evidence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 865, 874–75 (2001).
278
Cf. Daniel G. Arce M. & Todd Sandler, Counterterrorism: A Game-Theoretic Analysis, 49
J. CONFLICT RESOL. 183, 184 (2005) (using the traditional notion of deterrence in an analysis of counterterrorism policies).
279
Alternatively, deterrence theory might conduce to the use of prizes for cooperative
conduct. See Cook & MacDonald, supra note 167, at 350–51 (discussing the use of conditional cash transfers in crime prevention).
280
See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 5318 (2006) (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to require financial institutions to report suspicious transactions); 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (2012) (executing such authority); 31 C.F.R. § 103.122, .131 (2010).
281
For a general endorsement of this species of sanction, see Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 348 (2003) (“Group members might be punished not
because they are deemed collectively responsible for wrongdoing but simply because they
are in an advantageous position to identify, monitor, and control responsible individuals,
and can be motivated by the threat of sanctions to do so.”).
282
Nuno Garoupa et al., A Law and Economics Perspective on Terrorism, 128 PUB. CHOICE
147, 149 (2006). Garoupa et al. suggest that “groups and families [be] held (strictly) liable
for their members’ actions” such that “[w]ithin this framework of group-wide liability, family or group members of a terrorist become quasi-enforcers.” Id. (footnote omitted); see
also Levinson, supra note 281, at 388–91 (discussing potential consequences to collective
punishment of all members of a terrorist organization for an individual member’s actions).
It should go without saying that this proposal, which is pressed seriously by Garoupa et al.,
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The empirical evidence suggests, however, that deterrence of
neither the individualized nor the collective variety would be an effective prompt for the social production of counterterrorism.283 Deterrence theory nevertheless yields an important lesson about the
centrality of attitudes and beliefs to the efficacy of state efforts to elicit
changes in private behavior. To draw out that lesson, I first examine
the case against deterrence mechanisms.
A first cluster of objections to both kinds of deterrence rests on
evidence that while the criminal justice system as a whole has a deterrence effect, individual penalties may not. Deterrence is more often a
molar, not a granular, institutional attribute, and the evidence that
specific changes to laws or policies have even a small marginal effect is
surprisingly weak.284 Because public knowledge of specific criminal
laws, and a fortiori of marginal changes to criminal law, is fragile and
often vulnerable to hyperbolic discounting,285 it will often be implausible to conclude securely that a specific law has a stand-alone marginal deterrent effect when enacted against the backdrop of an
otherwise robust set of criminal regulations. This situation means that
increases at the margin in criminal penalties (especially at the highsentence end) will not necessarily translate into equivalent changes in
levels of perceived deterrence. In the ordinary run of criminal law,
therefore, the behavioral consequences of recalibrating specific punishments is uncertain.286
also raises substantial normative concerns. In examining the proposal from a relatively
consequentialist perspective, I do not mean to minimize or undermine those normative
concerns, which for many will be wholly dispositive without regard to more narrowly defined security-related consequences.
283
See, e.g., Gary LaFree & Laura Dugan, Research on Terrorism and Countering Terrorism,
38 CRIME & JUST. 413, 413 (2009) (noting that threats of severe consequence for terrorist
acts in general show little promise).
284
See Nagin, supra note 276, at 3; cf. Travis C. Pratt & Francis T. Cullen, Assessing
Macro-Level Predictors and Theories of Crime: A Meta-Analysis, 32 CRIME & JUST. 373, 378 (2005)
(concluding on the basis of a meta-analysis of studies that “with the exception of the effect
of incarceration, predictors related to the criminal justice system . . . are consistently
among the weakest predictors of crime”).
285
See, e.g., Kent A. McClelland & Geoffrey P. Alpert, Factor Analysis Applied to Magnitude Estimates of Punishment Seriousness: Patterns of Individual Differences, 1 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 307, 311 (1985) (finding hyperbolic discounting in estimates of punishment’s effect). In addition, empirical studies identify only a “consistently weak” correlation between perceived and actual levels of punishment. Paternoster, supra note 274, at
807. The most important study in this area is Gary Kleck et al., The Missing Link in General
Deterrence Research, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 623, 642 (2005). For another, similar study, see Lance
Lochner, Individual Perceptions of the Criminal Justice System, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 444, 450–51
(2007) (finding no correlation); see also Steven D. Levitt, Why Do Increased Arrest Rates Appear
to Reduce Crime: Deterrence, Incapacitation, or Measurement Error?, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 353, 353
(1998) (warning that “criminals may be poorly informed about the likelihood of
detection”).
286
See Michael Tonry, Learning from the Limitations of Deterrence Research, 37 CRIME &
JUST. 279, 280 (2008) (“[Deterrence] research is incapable of taking into account whether
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This difficulty counsels against increased reliance upon individualized deterrence to promote cooperation. Even in the financial context, recent congressional investigations suggest that the relevant
disclosure laws have failed to deter,287 and evidence of negative externalities from financial disclosure regulation grows.288 And even assuming that individualized penalties for failures to report suspicious
activity could be effective, it is unclear whether a duty to report suspicious activities would have a sufficiently predictable effect outside of
the highly structured financial domain. The range of potential triggers of such a duty may be so vast and the contextual justifications for
not reporting based on plausible innocent explanations so open-ended that formulating a verbal rule imposing a sufficiently clearly defined duty may be very difficult. Further, expanding the duty to
report by attaching criminal penalties would impose a heavy burden
of self-policing and blame on a discrete religious group in a way that,
for many, would raise substantial ethical concerns.289
A second cluster of objections bears on proposals for collective
deterrence. Empirical evidence suggests that deterrence effects are
only partly a function of the formal sanctions associated with punishment; they are more importantly a consequence of informal social
stigmatization sanctions.290 The social intermediation of deterrence
effects means that as the use of punitive sanctions increases, the
greater frequency of punishment “may erode the very basis for [the
punishment’s] effectiveness” and degrade the marginal impact of new
offenses.291 If the main conduit of deterrence effects is social (i.e.,
mediated through the normative views of peers and other members of
society), it may be especially perverse and counterproductive to
and to what extent purported policy changes are implemented, whether and to what extent their adoption or implementation is perceived by would-be offenders, and whether
and to what extent offenders are susceptible to influence by perceived changes in legal
threats.”).
287
See HSBC Exposed U.S. Financial System to Money Laundering, Drug, Terrorist Financing
Risks, HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS
(July 16, 2012), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/media/hsbcexposed-us-finacial-system-to-money-laundering-drug-terrorist-financing-risks (documenting both repeated circumvention of terrorism-financing restrictions and active disregard for violations).
288
See Khalid M. Medani, Financing Terrorism or Survival?: Informal Finance and State
Collapse in Somalia, and the US War on Terrorism, MIDDLE E. REP., Summer 2002, at 2, 9
(arguing that the application of terrorism-financing rules to traditional hawwalat systems
for sending remittances internationally have “precipitat[ed] a humanitarian disaster in
Somalia”).
289
See infra Part III.C.3.
290
See Nagin, supra note 276, at 4 (“[S]tudies suggest that the deterrent effect of formal sanctions arises principally from fear of the social stigma that their imposition triggers.”); accord Paternoster, supra note 274, at 781; Williams & Hawkins, supra note 227, at
562–66.
291
Nagin, supra note 276, at 5.
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broaden the scope of the state’s punitive brush to reach a potential
offender’s community.292 Criminalizing a whole community is likely
to make singling out certain behavior as undesirable more difficult.
Finally, a third reason for questioning deterrence’s application is
specific to the counterterrorism context. A series of empirical studies,
focusing upon the experiences of Muslims and non-Muslims in
London and New York who have been the focus of recent counterterrorism policing, examined the effect of deterrence-like mechanisms.
To that end, the studies analyzed panel data concerning expected
levels of cooperation with law enforcement to address potential terrorism threats.293 These studies conceptualized deterrence as a correlation between expected law enforcement attention on Muslim
communities for counterterrorism purposes and cooperation with law
enforcement in various forms.294 No correlation emerged, however,
from regressions testing for the predictors of cooperation.295 This result suggests that efforts to induce communities to serve as informants
under penalty of prison time will not be effective. That inference is
further supported by findings from other studies of deterrence-based
strategies in the counterterrorism context. A study of British efforts
against the Irish Republican Army (IRA), for example, found only
weak correlation between military deployments (the analog of punishment) and levels of terrorism.296 That is, the use of force did not
deter IRA terrorism. Because that study focused on military, rather
than police, interventions, its findings must be used with care. Nevertheless, the study at least suggests that the deployment of force does
not mitigate the rate of terrorism recruitment to the degree that advocates of deterrence might hope.
In sum, the lesson of deterrence theorizing may not be that the
state should pile penalties upon penalties in the hope of stimulating
security’s social production. If there is a lesson to be drawn, it is in292
Symptomatic of much economic work on deterrence in criminal law, Garoupa et al.
evince no awareness at all of the extensive empirical and theoretical literature on the role
of sanction perception in deterrence theory. See Garoupa et al., supra note 282.
293
These studies include Aziz Z. Huq et al., Mechanisms for Eliciting Cooperation in
Counterterrorism Policing: Evidence from the United Kingdom, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 728
(2011) [hereinafter Huq et al., Mechanisms]; Aziz Z. Huq et al., Why Does the Public Cooperate
with Law Enforcement?, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 419 (2011); Tom R. Tyler et al., Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 365 (2010).
294
That is, they tested the correlation between an expectation of heavy law enforcement attention on a specific community and a willingness to cooperate. For details of the
methodology, see, for example, Tyler et al., supra note 293, at 377–78.
295
See, e.g., id. at 379–80.
296
See Gary LaFree et al., The Impact of British Counterterrorist Strategies on Political Violence
in Northern Ireland: Comparing Deterrence and Backlash Models, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 17, 25–27, 34
(2009) (analyzing six high-visibility crackdown initiatives and concluding that only one had
any observable deterrent effect).
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stead more indirect: The deterrence literature points to “informal
sanctions” and in particular to concerns about “conventionality” and
the views of social peers as necessary intermediaries of deterrence effects.297 This suggests that shared expectations and endogenous
norms within specific populations have an effect upon rates of private
violence—a possibility that echoes the results of collective efficacy
studies. If deterrence theory has a tentative lesson then, it may be that
social context—comprising beliefs, attitudes, and associations—is an
important locus for the production of public security from terrorism.
B. Legitimacy Theory
The leading alternative to deterrence theory as an account of
how the state elicits desirable behavior from private individuals is organized around the concept of “legitimacy.”298 Like deterrence theory, legitimacy theory can be understood as a series of theses about
how state action alters individual perceptions and judgment, which in
turn influences individuals’ behaviors.299 Rather than focusing on
perceptions of expected costs or benefits, however, legitimacy theory
directs attention to individuals’ normative perceptions of the state. Its
core claim is that the perceived quality of state action, rather than the
quantity of ensuing costs or benefits, most accurately predicts individual decisions concerning compliance with legal rules and cooperation
with law enforcement.300 Of special relevance here, recent empirical
studies have identified legitimacy-related variables as statistically significant predictors of diverse forms of cooperation with law enforcement
counterterrorism efforts both in the United Kingdom and the United
States.
“Legitimacy is [a] property that a rule or an authority has when
others feel obligated to voluntarily defer to that rule or authority.”301
It arises as a consequence of “the belief that some decision made or
rule created by . . . authorities is valid in the sense that it is entitled to
297
See Nagin, supra note 276, at 19–21; accord ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 227, at
174–75. For further evidence of the effect of social interactions (writ large) on criminality,
see generally Edward L. Glaeser et al., Crime and Social Interactions, 111 Q.J. ECON. 507
(1996) (presenting a model of social interactions in relation to rates of different types of
crimes).
298
See, e.g., Tyler et al., supra note 293, at 366–67.
299
See Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 377–78 (2006).
300
See Tom R. Tyler & Jeffrey Fagan, Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the
Police Fight Crime in Their Communities?, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 231, 233–35 (2008).
301
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE
297 (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004) (“In other words, a legitimate authority is
one that is regarded by people as entitled to have its decisions and rules accepted and
followed by others . . . .”).
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be obeyed by virtue of who made the decision or how it was made”302
rather than the substance of the decision. Studies of policing suggest
that the legitimacy of a law enforcement entity is a function of the
fairness of the process used to make or apply rules and the quality of
the personal treatment people receive from authorities; together,
these make up the “procedural justice” of police action.303 A large
body of empirical work demonstrates that experiencing procedural
justice increases compliance with legal rules.304 For example, a belief
that the police engage in racial profiling will dampen public willingness to cooperate with law enforcement even among nonprofiled segments of the population.305 Studies suggest that procedural justice
effects are neither ephemeral nor trivial in magnitude. Rather, available evidence from the crime control context shows that legitimacyrelated reasons dominate deterrence effects.306 Moreover, studies
find that procedural justice predicts voluntary cooperation with policing efforts better than belief in the efficacy of the police or the risk of
crime.307 Police legitimacy, nevertheless, is not the only relevant factor these studies identify. Echoing the arguments of the collective efficacy literature, empirical studies also identify social cohesion as a
better predictor of crime victims’ willingness to approach the police
302
Tyler, supra note 299, at 377; cf. HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF
OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY 16 (1989)
(identifying legitimacy with a felt “duty to obey superior orders”).
303
See TOM R. TYLER, PSYCHOLOGY AND THE DESIGN OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 37–41
(2007) (defining procedural justice).
304
See generally TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING PUBLIC
COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS 49–58 (2002) (discussing the role of procedural justice in causing people to accept third-party decisions); Ben Bradford et al., Contact
and Confidence: Revisiting the Impact of Public Encounters with the Police, 19 POLICING & SOC’Y 20
(2009) (finding that positively received contacts, feeling informed about police activities,
and procedural justice-type factors increase communities’ perceptions of fairness); Stephen D. Mastrofski et al., Compliance on Demand: The Public’s Response to Specific Police Requests, 33 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 269 (1996) (finding that legitimating factors most
increased compliance with police requests).
305
See Tom R. Tyler & Cheryl J. Wakslak, Profiling and Police Legitimacy: Procedural Justice, Attributions of Motive, and Acceptance of Police Authority, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 253, 276 (2004).
306
See, e.g., Clemens Kroneberg et al., The Interplay of Moral Norms and Instrumental
Incentives in Crime Causation, 48 CRIMINOLOGY 259, 283–84 (2010) (“[I]nstrumental incentives were taken into account only if respondents did not feel bound by strongly internalized norms.”). In a recent meta-analysis, Travis Pratt and Francis Cullen also found that
deterrence has only weak support, while “social disorganization” theory, which employs
concepts such as collective efficacy, has “strong empirical support.” Pratt & Cullen, supra
note 284, at 427–30. For an argument that legitimacy-based measures in fact succeed in
crime control where deterrence-based measures have persistently failed, see KENNEDY,
supra note 173, at 207–10, 219–31.
307
See Tyler & Fagan, supra note 300, at 262–63; see also Tom R. Tyler, Policing in Black
and White: Ethnic Group Differences in Trust and Confidence in the Police, 8 POLICE Q. 322,
333–36 (2005) [hereinafter Tyler, Policing in Black and White] (finding a relationship between trust and cooperation with the police in a survey of racial minorities in New York).
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than police effectiveness.308 In short, plural forms of trust of social
peers and of police seem to motivate the social production of security
against crime.
The aforementioned surveys of London and New York Muslim
and non-Muslim communities have extended these findings to the
counterterrorism domain.309 Those studies found a strong association
between willingness to cooperate with antiterrorism policing and perceptions of procedural justice in both the U.S. and the U.K. contexts.310 Among both Muslim and non-Muslim samples in the study,
individual judgments about the procedural justice of police action
against terrorism provided the most powerful predictor of expressed
willingness to cooperate, either by reporting information about the
possibility of a planned terrorist attack, by attending meetings called
by the police, or by performing neighborhood-watch-like functions as
a way of easing the burden that the police must shoulder.311 British
and American Muslim samples, however, identified different components of procedural justice as salient. Whereas American Muslims appeared most concerned with measures that overtly singled them out
for different, harsher treatment (and hence, potential stigmatization
by others), British Muslims indicated that what they found most objectionable was the fact of being classified on the basis of a group trait
(religion) rather than being judged based on individual
characteristics.312
Procedural justice effects also spill over from populations most
often impacted by policing. Echoing findings from earlier empirical
308
See Heike Goudriaan et al., Neighborhood Characteristics and Reporting Crime: Effects of
Social Cohesion, Confidence in Police Effectiveness and Socio-Economic Disadvantage, 46 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 719, 737–38 (2006) (reporting results from a hierarchical linear model of
data gathered from a nationwide survey of the Netherlands).
309
See supra text accompanying notes 293–95.
310
The following paragraph summarizes data and analysis in Huq et al., Mechanisms,
supra note 293, and Tyler et al., supra note 293.
311
A collateral benefit of procedural justice may be that it dampens individuals’ approval of private violence for either political or private ends. See Jonathan Jackson et al.,
Police Legitimacy and Public Attitudes Toward Private Violence 13 (Univ. of Chi., Public Law
Working Paper No. 372, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1984957 (identifying “a persistent negative correlation between normative
judgments about the police and the public’s attitudes to diverse kinds of private violence”).
312
Compare Huq et al., Mechanisms, supra note 293, at 748 (“[T]argeting individuals is
evaluated as fair, while targeting communities is regarded as being illegitimate and unfair.”),
with Tyler et al., supra note 293, at 387 (“The one issue related to having a Muslim background [that influenced cooperation with police] identified as important was the feeling
that Muslims are discriminated against by the society at large.”). These findings contrast
with what for many would be obvious priors about Americans and British: That is, they
suggest that American Muslims are more concerned with the positional good of relative
social standing, whereas British Muslims are concerned with the absolute good of antidiscrimination. Given the greater acknowledgement of class distinctions in British society,
this result is especially interesting. It may suggest that dynamics in the process of immigrant assimilation in these two national contexts warrant some further exploration.
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work on crime control policing,313 these studies of counterterrorism
policing suggest that the quality of counterterrorism police action affects not only its direct objects, but also the general population. Members of non–Muslim American populations evinced less willingness to
cooperate in counterterrorism policing efforts when they believed
that police violated norms of procedural justice in dealing with minority communities.314 This suggests that the procedural justice effects
on cooperative behavior are grounded not on self-focused expectations but more on evaluations of an institution’s behavior toward all
members of the public.
These studies are, of course, not conclusive, even if they provide
powerful evidence. It is important to emphasize that they contain corrleational evidence alone rather than direct proof of causation. Further, the survey instrument used in these studies measured only
expressed willingness to cooperate—as observed willingness to cooperate
is resistant to easy measurement in the counterterrorism context.
Nevertheless, evidence from other panel studies suggests that expressed procedural justice judgments correlate not only with individuals’ expressed willingness to follow the law but also with their
subsequently observed compliance with legal rules.315
Legitimacy theory thus has a straightforward application to the
design of state efforts to elicit cooperation: respectful policing yields
cooperation on security matters as in matters of crime control. Although often presented in contradistinction to deterrence theory, legitimacy theory in fact echoes deterrence theory’s emphasis on the
public’s beliefs and attitudes about the law as mediating mechanisms.316 Echoing the lesson of deterrence theory, a central take-away
here is that designers of policies to elicit counterterrorism’s social production cannot merely decree private behavior, but must focus on in313
See Tyler & Wakslak, supra note 305, at 275–77 (discussing effects of racial profiling
on nonprofiled populations); accord Tyler, Policing in Black and White, supra note 307, at
336–37 (finding similar effects). The same spillover effect has been identified in studies of
the Israeli population. See Tal Jonathan & David Weisburd, How Do Majority Communities
View the Potential Costs of Policing Terrorism? Findings from a Community Survey in Israel, 4 POLICING 169, 178 (2010).
314
Note that the studies did not include samples of non-Muslim Londoners, who
could serve as a comparator group.
315
See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler et al., Reintegrative Shaming, Procedural Justice, and Recidivism:
The Engagement of Offenders’ Psychological Mechanisms in the Canberra RISE Drinking-and-Driving
Experiment, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 553, 578 (2007). It is, to be sure, a major weakness in
many legitimacy studies that data can be gathered only on expressed willingness to act and
not on actual actions. I am not persuaded that this alone is reason to reject their findings.
As a matter of my first-order intuitions, I find it much more plausible to posit that individuals tend to operate more on the basis of reciprocity and fairness norms than on the narrowly nonaltruistic predicates of rational-choice analysis.
316
Again, it is important to emphasize that economists’ models assume away the problem of mediating perception to create models that are less “complex and contingent” but
also, in my view, less reliable. Tonry, supra note 286, at 303.
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dividuals’ attitudes, beliefs, and associations, especially a cluster of
normative judgments concerning the state.
C. Policies to Empower Local Partners
Attention to deterrence and legitimacy theories alike suggests
that beliefs, attitudes, and associations play a large role in determining
levels of welfare-enhancing social actions against terrorism. The state
cannot simply decree what it wants. Rather, it must work with the
“cognitive structures which social agents implement in their practical
knowledge of the social world.”317 That focus in turn draws attention
to design decisions embedded in domestic counterterrorism policy
that rely on social action respecting the choice of policing strategies
and the state’s approach to associational pluralism. My aim in this
Part is to provide a context for thinking about counterterrorism’s social production. I focus on the United States, where the Empowering
Local Partners strategy is at a more ductile stage than the Prevent strategy. Where relevant, I also identify and discuss relevant legal, doctrinal, and constitutional rules. After raising those policy questions, I
close by identifying an important normative question that currently
risks being answered through drift and inattention rather than
through careful consideration.
1. Counterterrorism Policing’s Internal Tension
Legal scholarship about counterterrorism policing to date has addressed the allocation of responsibilities between federal agencies on
the one hand, and state and local police agencies on the other.318
Exploration of the social production of counterterrorism, however,
raises another tension that is implicit to policing terrorism, albeit one
that does not map crisply on to the local-national dichotomy: when
police believe they have identified a community of interest for national security purposes, they have two tactical options to pursue,
which map very roughly onto two of the most important recent styles
of contemporary policing: intelligence-led policing and community
policing. These policing approaches may well be in tension, at least
given current American approaches to counterterrorism.
Since the mid-twentieth century, American policing has undergone several waves of reform, starting with a heightened attention to
“professionalism” in the 1950s, going through a vogue for “community policing” in the late 1980s, and moving most recently toward a
317
PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE 470
(Richard Nice trans., 2010).
318
See generally Waxman, supra note 40, at 310–23 (describing common framings of the
debate).
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fascination with “intelligence-led policing” (ILP).319 Community policing is a loosely related set of policing strategies that tend to emphasize trust building between police and local communities.320 Such
approaches thus highlight proximity to a policed population, consultation, and cooperative modalities of policing. By contrast, ILP “emphasizes the use of intelligence collection and data analysis to guide
the selection and implementation of police policies”321 and bears
some kinship to the earlier professionalism ideal. Both community
policing and ILP have intuitive appeal in the counterterrorism context. On the one hand, the kind of partnerships community policing
fosters appear to be well tailored to mitigate the epistemic problem in
confronting domestic-source terrorism.322 On the other hand, policing strategies that turn on aggregated data and algorithmic predictive
tools seem to address the same epistemic deficit without the frictions
of actual interactions with fickle community members.323 At least at
one level, there is some space between the two approaches.
Experiences in both the United Kingdom and the United States
suggest tensions between these two approaches, at least in the specific
policies adopted in the counterterrorism context.324 As implemented
to date, some forms of ILP may undermine causal mechanisms of
counterterrorism’s social production that community policing might
319

See David Alan Sklansky, The Persistent Pull of Police Professionalism, NEW PERSP. POLICMar. 2011, at 1, 1–3, available at https://ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/232676.pdf.
320
See JEREMY M. WILSON, COMMUNITY POLICING IN AMERICA 8 (2006) (“The basic philosophy of [community-oriented policing] is that increasing the quality and quantity of
contacts between citizens and police to resolve community concerns can enhance community life.”); see also JEROME H. SKOLNICK & DAVID H. BAYLEY, THE NEW BLUE LINE: POLICE
INNOVATION IN SIX AMERICAN CITIES 10–11 (1986) (describing the emergence of community policing). For a sense of the variations within community policing, see Tracey L.
Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1593, 1596–600 (2002) (discussing
varieties of community policing) and Michael D. Reisig, Community and Problem-Oriented
Policing, 39 CRIME & JUST. 1, 2–3 (2010) (same).
321
Sklansky, supra note 319, at 3.
322
See William Lyons, Partnerships, Information and Public Safety: Community Policing in a
Time of Terror, 25 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 530, 532–33 (2002) (identifying an “information gap” in current policing and suggesting that “this means partnering with those citizens who have the information we need”); accord Michael P. Downing,
Policing Terrorism in the United States: The Los Angeles Police Department’s Convergence Strategy,
POLICE CHIEF, Feb. 2009, at 28, 29, available at http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/
magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=1729&issue_id=22009 (“The
strengths of U.S. local law enforcement agencies are drawn from[, among other things,]
. . . a community policing infrastructure . . . . These strengths all make local police supremely capable of being valuable contributors to U.S. counterterrorism efforts.”).
323
For endorsements of intelligence-led policing’s use, although not in these terms,
see George L. Kelling & William J. Bratton, Policing Terrorism, CIVIC BULL., Sept. 2006, at 1,
5–7, available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cb_43.pdf and Edmund F. McGarrell et al., Intelligence-Led Policing as a Framework for Responding to Terrorism, 23 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 142, 147 (2007).
324
This tension is distinct from the line drawn by David Thacher between “community
protection” and “offender search.” See Thacher, supra note 117, at 637–38.
ING,
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cultivate.325 This possibility particularly arises in those instances
where a state implements ILP in a way that singles out a specific population for heightened scrutiny. In many instances, the targeted population will be defined by faith (typically Islam).326 To isolate a specific
group based on a religious identity and then to allocate investigative
resources to that group alone is to invite opposition and distrust from
that group. Even measures that superficially seem to impose no burden, such as federal and state efforts to “map” Muslim communities,
have been perceived as imposing dignitary harms and communicating
group stigma.327 The same measures may also raise substantial constitutional concerns that are beyond the scope of this Article.328 In addition, specific intelligence-gathering tools often employed in the
counterterrorism context may impose particularized harms on the
very individuals and voluntary associations central to counterterrorism’s social production. For instance, “heavy informant use” that
might be part of an ILP strategy can “impose[ ]collateral harms,” in325
To be clear, the claim here is that counterterrorism ILP has been implemented in
cities such as New York and Los Angeles in ways that undermine collective efficacy and
other predicates of counterterrorism’s social production. I make no claim that it is impossible to craft a form of ILP that is sensitive to such conflicts. Cf. McGarrell et al., supra note
323, at 142 (“[T]here does not appear to be a commonly accepted definition of ILP nor of
the practical implications for police agencies’ mission, structure, and processes.”).
326
See, e.g., Richard Winton et al., Outcry over Muslim Mapping, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 10,
2007, at A1.
327
See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS
GUIDE § 4 (2008), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/images/nytint/
docs/the-new-operations-manual-from-the-f-b-i/original.pdf (envisaging mapping communities based on race or ethnicity and the issues that police would need to be mindful of in
undertaking that activity); Winton et al., supra note 326 (discussing controversial Los Angeles Police Department plans to map Los Angeles’s Muslim community). Even though local
police departments have epistemic and personnel advantages that conduce to stronger
reliance on them in counterterrorism efforts, Waxman, supra note 40, at 321–22, such
police forces can clearly still adopt strategic frameworks drawn from intelligence-led policing that trigger tension with local communities. Stated otherwise, there is no reason to
believe that local police are more likely to be sensitive to community concerns simply because they have local roots.
328
In the Court’s recent decision in United States v. Jones, Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s
and Justice Samuel Alito’s concurring opinions posited that Justices may recognize the
possibility that long-term surveillance, even when confined to locations to which police
have lawful access, can nonetheless “chill[ ] associational and expressive freedoms . . . by
making available at a relatively low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate information
about any person whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track.”
132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also id. at 961–62, 964 (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (focusing the Fourth Amendment analysis on “the use of a
GPS for the purpose of long-term tracking” (emphasis omitted)). Although the analogy is
not precise, Jones is salient here because it shows that concerns of constitutional magnitude
are triggered by temporally durable investigations in the absence of a warrant (let alone
reasonable suspicion). It suggests that temporally extensive surveillance within public
spaces, especially when enabled by novel technologies that would not have been available
at the time of the Bill of Rights’ ratification, trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny to a degree that only recently would have been thought unlikely.
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cluding the “erosion of personal relationships and trust” within a community that is otherwise under economic or societal pressures.329
Such harms are likely amplified when the surveiled space is religious,
as many believe that formal religious institutions ought to be thoroughly insulated from state intrusions.330
The U.K. experience provides one example of undesirable interaction effects between different counterterrorism strategies. There,
perceived overlap between Prevent and terrorism investigative efforts
fostered opposition to the former and public protests over “excessive
policing.”331 In response to these objections, the Home Office has
committed to maintaining a firewall between the two kinds of state
action.332 While the United States has not rolled out Empowering Local
Partners to the same degree, similar conflicts with other elements of
current law enforcement strategy might be anticipated. For example,
immediately after the White House proclaimed in Empowering Local
Partners its “robust training program with rigorous curriculum standards” designed to “facilitate local partnerships to prevent violent extremism,”333 news organizations released evidence of the FBI’s use of
training materials about Muslim Americans that portrayed them as
terrorists in a categorical and derogatory fashion.334 Whatever positive expressive effects might have flowed from Empowering Local Partners were likely extinguished as a result of a policing mentality that
views Muslim Americans solely as objects of suspicion and sources of
threat. Or consider the now well-publicized case in which a California
Muslim community not only reported a mosque attendee to the FBI
but also obtained a restraining order against the attendee, only then
to learn that he was an informant and agent provocateur for the federal government.335 It seems safe to presume that this incident did
not increase that mosque’s willingness to report suspicious activity.
329

Natapoff, supra note 271, at 684.
See Jerry Markon, Mosque Infiltration Feeds Muslims’ Distrust of FBI, WASH. POST, Dec.
5, 2010, at A1; Thomas Watkins, Suit Claims FBI Violates Muslims’ Rights at Mosque, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20110223/usmosque-spy-lawsuit/ (“Plaintiffs in a lawsuit against the FBI said . . . that the agency’s use of
a paid informant to infiltrate California mosques has left them and other Muslims with an
enduring fear that their phones and e-mails are being screened and their physical whereabouts monitored.”).
331
See Walker & Rehman, supra note 89, at 266–67 (describing “the dissonance between the community approaches [of Prevent] and other aspects of government policy”).
332
PREVENT STRATEGY, supra note 11, at 31–32 (committing to a separation of “Prevent” from “Pursue” activities).
333
2011 EMPOWERING LOCAL PARTNERS, supra note 9, at 6.
334
See Lisa Fernandez, Local Groups Allege Biased Training Colors FBI Dealings with American Muslims, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 15, 2011, http://ca.cair.com/sfba/news/local_
groups_allege_biased_training_colors_fbi_dealings_with_american_musli.
335
See Paul Harris, The Ex-FBI Informant with a Change of Heart: ‘There Is No Real Hunt.
It’s Fixed,’ GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 20, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/
20/fbi-informant (“[T]he FBI . . . told Monteilh to act like a radical himself to lure out
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The point is not that ILP is conceptually impossible to reconcile
with the social production of counterterrorism, but rather that the
prevailing modalities of investigation that now characterize
counterterrorism ILP are hard to square with the cultivation of
counterterrorism’s social production given the causal mechanisms
that have been herein identified.336 At a minimum, some ILP methods invite accusations that cooperation efforts are sub rosa spying
tools; such accusations plagued early iterations of the Prevent strategy.337 At worst, ILP methods undermine police legitimacy and are
thereby likely to diminish the flow of voluntary information to law enforcement.338 Investigative agencies, whether local or national, thus
must choose between the social production of counterterrorism and
extant policies that alienate relevant communities,339 prioritizing either “intelligence” or “community engagement.”340
2. Multis e Gentibus Vires341
The social production of counterterrorism is reasonably understood to be plural in nature. It may involve multiple mechanisms, diverse mediating social actors, and distinct beliefs or attitudes toward
values, the state, and peers. The ideological competition and ethical
anchoring mechanisms described in Part II, for example, may operate
through wholly disparate modalities of social action without any overlap. Or the same social actors may turn out to play key roles in each of
these mechanisms. Given this foundational pluralism, it would seem
desirable, at least in the absence of compelling countervailing evidence, to encourage a civil society with many forms of associations.
Strength, that is, may emerge not from the homogeneity of preferences and beliefs but from diversity. Accordingly, assuming that the
state must select one sole set of interlocutors as the vehicle for the
production of national security—as participants in the debates around
the Prevent strategy in particular have done—is likely a mistake. Nor
Islamist sympathizers” by “befriending Muslims and blanket recording their
conversations.”).
336
For one example of this tension arising in practice, see Charlie Savage, F.B.I. Scrutinized for Amassing Data on Ethnic and Religious Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2011, at A20.
337
See generally Barclay, supra note 95 (discussing the reactions of various Muslim
groups, including extremists, to the British government’s decision to reinstate the Prevent
program).
338
The New York Police Department appears to have engendered such a result. See
Joe Coscarelli, NYPD Even Spied on the Muslim Leaders Who Were Helping Them, N.Y. MAG.
(Oct. 6, 2011, 10:36 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intel/2011/10/nypd_even_spied_on_
the_muslim.html.
339
It is not inevitable that police will adopt the more technology-heavy approach. See,
e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Police in Los Angeles Step Up Efforts to Gain Muslims’ Trust, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 2011, at A17.
340
2010 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 8, at 19.
341
In Latin, from many peoples, strength.
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does the state need to articulate an “official Islam,” with any potential
First Amendment issues that this might entail.342 Rather than identifying a unique target for subvention, the state may wish to design its
support with an eye to ensuring a spectrum of perspectives.343
How the state fosters a diverse civil society is too large a question
with too complex a set of answers to answer fairly here.344 It is nevertheless worth noting that policing policies and strategies can play a
role. Advocates of community policing strategies have long argued
that their proposals are a means for communities “to shape their own
norms” so as to yield political “empowerment.”345 This claim rests on
a notion that shared norms can support actions that are individually
risky but collectively beneficial, a notion that finds empirical support
in other instances of risky collective action, such as the civil rights
movement.346 The resulting accrual of collective efficacy can catalyze
virtuous circles, some argue, in which the state’s recognition and reliance on beneficial immanent social norms has the effect of reinforcing those norms.347 To the extent that these claims find empirical
342
See generally Rascoff, supra note 82, at 162–79 (analyzing Establishment Clause issues
raised by “official Islam” efforts). In my view, the most salient strand of Establishment
Clause doctrine in regard to such efforts is the rule against denominational preferences,
which has been applied to gerrymandered-exemption regimes but not to funding decisions. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982) (invalidating an exception regime with denominational preferences).
343
Broad support across the ideological spectrum, unlike efforts to sort between desirable and undesirable versions of a faith, is not just permitted but is sometimes required
pursuant to the First Amendment. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 828–29 (1995) (discussing the constitutional prohibition on viewpoint
discrimination).
344
For a useful study of how the state can foster “social networks that bridge the various splits in contemporary American communities,” see ROBERT D. PUTNAM ET AL., BETTER
TOGETHER: RESTORING THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 3 (2003).
345
Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in the Inner City, 32 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 805, 830 (1998); see also Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1513, 1515 (2002) (“Most of the New Community Policing
strategies, in contrast, do foster reciprocal cooperation across one or more of these collective-action settings.”). An alternative dynamic is worth noting. Rather than cooperating
with the state when they expect others to cooperate, people might cooperate when they
expect others not to cooperate. This possibility can be modeled in game-theoretic terms as
a “chicken” game—so called because its payoffs track a scenario in which two teenage
drivers career headlong into one another hoping the other will blink first. See Richard H.
McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L.
REV. 209, 223–30 (2009). If this dynamic takes hold, then community members will be
moved to aid police precisely when they believe that no one else will. The chicken game,
however, seems to rest on an adversarial relationship between participants that does not
have a clear parallel in the policing context. Id. As such, it is unlikely to provide useful
guidance.
346
See DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 112–40
(1991).
347
Cf. KENNEDY, supra note 173, at 230–31 (noting the potential for self-reinforcing
positive dynamics through growing interactions between communities and police in the
crime control context).
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support, they support a migration of successful community policing
measures into the counterterrorism context.
In addition to positive policy innovations, the state may also need
to avoid certain steps that would destroy existing social infrastructure
of value in the national security context. This caution may have some
bite given recent changes in First Amendment doctrine. Although it
is typically believed that the First Amendment’s rights of free speech
and association effectively shelter the private associational ecosystem
from intrusive state interference or direction,348 recent redrawings of
the First Amendment’s doctrinal boundaries have substantially eased
restrictions upon the state’s ability to punish (and, a fortiori, chill)
speech directed at a terrorist group. One side effect of this change
will likely be a reduction in the observed diversity of perspectives in
suspect communities most relevant to the social production of
counterterrorism.
Longstanding First Amendment doctrine instructed that the state
cannot “forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”349 The recent Supreme Court decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, however, enables the imposition of criminal sanctions
on speech based on a mere possibility, rather than a certainty, that
violence will occur.350 Notwithstanding the Court’s insistence in that
case that it was not changing longstanding doctrine, the resulting ruling seems to give the state a free hand in regulating pure speech, even
absent a threat of violence, provided that a designated terrorist group
is somehow implicated. Although less noted, the Humanitarian Law
Project decision’s footprint has effects beyond the First Amendment
domain. It also extends the domain of instances in which a criminal
prosecution is conceivable, because the limits on the FBI’s investigative authority are keyed to First Amendment limits.351 That is, the ju348
See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 11,
241–43 (1993) (emphasizing the First Amendment’s role in sheltering spaces for private
deliberation and discussion).
349
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). Furthermore, advocacy of violence “at some indefinite future time” is not sufficient to take speech outside First Amendment shelter; only a “rational inference” of “imminent disorder” will suffice. Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108–09 (1973) (emphasis omitted).
350
See 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730–31 (2010) (upholding the application of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B (2006), a criminal-material-support provision, to pure speech without advocacy of
violence if directed at a designated terrorist organization); see also Aziz Z. Huq, Preserving
Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR (Jan. 20, 2012), at 16,
19–23, http://www.columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/16_Huq.pdf
(criticizing the result in Humanitarian Law Project on doctrinal grounds and exploring its
effects on First Amendment protections).
351
See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS 13 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/
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dicial loosening of First Amendment protections was, in effect,
simultaneously an expansion of federal investigative authority. Even if
the number of criminal prosecutions remains the same, therefore,
civic associations that hold convergent views as designated terrorist organizations on, say, foreign policy or religious dogma have sound reasons for trimming their rhetoric and undertaking precautions against
intrusive state scrutiny.352 They are now at risk of incurring penalties
based on weak speech-based associations with designated terrorism organizations. In effect, just as a diversity of perspectives encompassing
robust ideological competition potentially takes on new social value, it
is coming under increasing legal pressure.
Finally, states might also be attentive to the collateral costs of increasing the diversity of civil society. That is, the state’s endorsement
and support of entities might have spillover effects, for example, by
enabling those associations to engage in other practices or promulgate other views that impose harms on subpopulations of the
group.353 Yet the mere existence of such spillover does not in itself
establish the undesirability of such groups’ inclusion.354 Rather, the
identification of such spillover provokes the further question of
whether the marginal gain in security is greater than any marginal
cost along other social desiderata.
3. The Ethics of Counterterrorism’s Social Production
In the course of instrumentalizing counterterrorism’s social production, the state is likely to confront a normative dilemma, one that I
have intimated but have not yet cleanly surfaced. In American legal
circles, that dilemma is typically framed in terms of constitutional antidiscrimination norms pursuant to the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
guidelines.pdf (prohibiting the FBI from “investigating or collecting or maintaining information on United States persons solely for the purpose of monitoring activities protected
by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States”).
352
The hypothesis that increased surveillance and “stepped-up control efforts” reduce
organizational activity is supported by studies of the civil rights movement, which found
that “the recruitment of new members [was] especially difficult as repression against insurgents intensified.” MCADAM, supra note 176, at 219.
353
An obvious and highly significant example here is beliefs about gender norms. See
generally Mona Eltahawy, Why Do They Hate Us?: The War on Women in the Middle East, FOREIGN POL’Y, May/June 2012, at 64 (discussing Arab countries’ government endorsements of
male-dominated societies and the endorsements’ effects on women’s quality of life). It is
an important question whether any gains in security from reliance on some religious
groups are worth the cost in lost gender equality from the implicit endorsement of those
groups’ hierarchical views in respect to gender, one that merits more attention than I can
give here.
354
For a polemic that assumes any such spillover cannot be justified, see Douglas Murray, Britain’s Islamist Split: The Government Is Divided on Whether Muslims and Non-Muslims
Should Be Subject to the Same Standards, WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052702304432304576371551974233360.html.
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Amendments. My aim here is to sketch that dilemma without the encumbering apparatus of constitutional doctrine, since a legal framing
pushes toward binary decisions that suppress, rather than acknowledge, complexity.
Counterterrorism involves the identification of specific communities both as objects of suspicion and as resources to address risk. Today, the targeted community—Muslim Americans and ethnic identity
proxies—is largely, if informally, defined by minority religious identity; the community is also subject to nontrivial levels of private discrimination.355 Governments, as a result, view Muslims as
simultaneously “victims, partners and threats.”356 States impose burdens and responsibilities not on the basis of individual actions, but on
the basis of coreligionists’ claims for which members of the community have scant sympathy and no control. Both the imposition of burdens and the adumbration of responsibilities ought to trigger
normative reflection. That the state does both at the same time—in
effect, placing uniquely contradictory demands on one minority community—should provoke a longer pause.
On the one hand, states subject Muslim American communities
to heightened levels of scrutiny and intrusion on the ground that the
statistical probability of identifying a potential terrorist is higher when
targeting that community than when targeting the general population. In the contemporary context, the state is drifting, albeit without
focused attention, toward the view that reliance on religious identify
as a proxy for terrorist risk is acceptable.357 Accordingly, judges, like
other official actors, may similarly drift to the view that certain groups
merit less constitutional solicitude on loosely reasoned, inarticulate,
but deeply felt assumptions about the dynamics of
counterterrorism.358
Yet at the same time, policies such as Prevent and Empowering Local Partners seek to impose responsibilities on those same communities
for the production of collective security. Alone among ethnic, relig355
See Aziz Z. Huq, Private Religious Discrimination, National Security, and the First Amendment, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 350–57 (2011) (collecting data showing trends in discrimination and examining possible explanations for those trends).
356
HICKMAN ET AL., supra note 21, at 14.
357
Official actors can also focus on cultural traits rather than religious traits to the
same effect. See Murad Hussain, Note, Defending the Faithful: Speaking the Language of Group
Harm in Free Exercise Challenges to Counterterrorism Profiling, 117 YALE L.J. 920, 926 (2008)
(defining post-9/11 “‘cultural profiling’ as law enforcement policies that specifically target
expressions of cultural identity as proxy criteria thought to be correlated with criminality,
terrorist connections, or other subversive propensities”).
358
A similar dynamic operated during the 1950s with respect to communism. See, e.g.,
William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: The Background of Dennis v United States, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 375, 377 (“[T]he Court imposed on Communists a
special and diminished status under the Constitution.”).
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ious, and racial groups, American and British Muslims are asked to
shoulder a particularized responsibility for national security that is not
shared by other groups—again, not as a consequence of what all
members of those communities have done, but as a consequence of
their coreligionists’ actions. Burdens of suspicion are thus compounded by obligations to organize communal life in a way that benefits the larger society even if it compromises shared confessional life.
What might have been an autonomous domain of civil society becomes a grossly functional appendage of the state. In this fashion,
religious communities already stigmatized and corroded by suspicion
undergo a second, additional kind of loss that sounds in autonomy
and equality. Further, the state claims that the actions of a very small
subset of that minority group have triggered a collective responsibility
that applies to all members of the group. Yet this kind of shared attribution based on a common racial, ethnic, or religious identity is typically thought to raise pressing normative concerns. Just as labeling
one minority religious or ethnic group in categorical and derogatory
terms seems problematic, so too labeling a specific minority as especially responsible for the production of security against terrorism may
be cause for normative concern.
One way to resolve these tensions would be more for governments to explicitly recognize the heightened burdens and expectations imposed on certain ethnic and religious groups. To the extent
there is a risk that government externalizes inefficient costs on such
communities—either in the form of asymmetrical policing attention
or expectations of cooperation—one possible compensating mechanism would use constitutional and statutory tort actions.359 Across the
board, however, courts have been chary of allowing any money
payouts from flawed national security actions.360 Reasoning back
from hypothesized (but empirically unsubstantiated) concerns that related litigation risk will deter officials from vigorous actions, federal
judges have typically declined to attach any fiscal penalties even in
cases of obvious error and large harms.361 Nor has the federal government acted sua sponte to remedy its own numerous and well-documented mistakes.
359
This assumes that damages awards against government officials have a deterrent
effect, but that assumption is debated. Compare Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay:
Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 370–71
(2000) (arguing that damages awards against government officials do not have a deterrent
effect), with David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted
Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1225 (arguing the opposite). This also assumes that
identification of the correct recipients of compensatory awards would be a straightforward
endeavor—which is also far from clear.
360
See Huq, Against Exceptionalism, supra note 41, at 242–48 (documenting the absence
of damages awards in cases challenging national security-related policies).
361
See id.
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Constitutional violations in the specific context of counterterrorism policing have not proved to be an exception to this pattern.
Rather, such challenges have revealed that federal judges have been
extremely unwilling to furnish any meaningful response to harms imposed by excessive or unjustified policing measures.
In the August 2012 case of Fazaga v. FBI, for example, a federal
district court in southern California dismissed a constitutional challenge to the FBI’s alleged aggressive use of informants and “an indiscriminate ‘dragnet’ investigation [of] . . . Muslims in Southern
California based on their religion” because allowing the suit to proceed would reveal “state secrets.”362
In refusing to allow the allegations to be tested, the court relied
on the fact that the government would be forced to reveal details of its
domestic investigative strategies in course of defending such claims.363
Both the government’s argument and the court’s endorsement
thereof are puzzling. Assuming arguendo that a challenged investigation had legitimate ends, it follows that one potential, and perhaps
even dominant, goal of the investigation was the criminal prosecution
of those identified as posing a security risk. Notwithstanding much
attention to alternatives to Article III proceeding, there is still a large
subset of cases in which criminal prosecution is the sole practically
available option when a terrorism suspect is identified in the United
States.364 If a legitimate investigation is one that necessarily must include criminal prosecution as a potential endgame, the Fazaga court’s
logic comes under some considerable strain. After all, if it wishes to
362
Fazaga v. FBI, No. 8:11-cv-00301-CJC (VBKx), 2012 WL 3327092, at *10, *13–14
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2012) (“[B]ecause further litigation of this action would require or, at
the very least, create an unjustifiable risk of disclosure of state secrets, the Court finds that
dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims, aside from their [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA)] claim, is required . . . .”). In a related action, the same judge allowed claims under
FISA, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811, 1821–1829, 1841–1846, 1861–1862, 1871 (2006), to proceed
against the Agent defendants. See Fazaga v. FBI, No. 8:11-cv-00301-CJC (VBKx), 2012 WL
3541711, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2012).
363
See Fazaga, 2012 WL 3327092, at *13 (“[T]he Government will inevitably need the
privileged information to defend against Plaintiffs’ core allegation [of religious profiling]
. . . .”).
364
To be sure, criminal prosecution is not the only device in the government’s possession for incapacitating terrorism suspects; the government can also employ military or immigration detention. See Huq, Forum Choice, supra note 273, at 1434–43 (discussing
noncriminal civil and military detention as alternatives to Article III criminal prosecution).
But the Obama administration has eschewed the highly controversial use of military authority in the United States, and immigration authority would not avail where a suspect
proves to be a U.S. citizen. In any case, senior policymakings attest to the considerable
practical advantages of an Article III forum for criminal charges. See generally John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, Address at the
Harvard Law School Program on Law and Security: Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/thepress-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adheringour-values-an (praising Article III forums).
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secure a conviction or even maintain its credibility through plea bargaining, the government must necessarily be willing to air details of its
investigative strategy as a consequence of constitutionally imposed disclosure obligations in any criminal proceeding.365 The Court’s conclusion thus rests on the assumption that an investigation necessarily
designed to terminate in an Article III criminal process could not be
interrogated via an Article III civil process. This is a confused and
unjustified result. There is no sound reason to distinguish between
the civil and criminal processes in this fashion. To be sure, Congress
has enacted a general framework statute to facilitate criminal prosecution and convictions366 and has not done the same for civil proceedings. But it is not at all clear that federal judges lack the discretion to
adopt, mutatis mutandi, procedural devices from the criminal context
for use in civil actions.367 Nor is it clear why the government should
be the sole beneficiary of litigation technologies for the management
of classified information. It may be that a better, more accurate explanation of the result in Fazaga, given the sweeping, unreflective nature
of the district court’s analysis, is the unspoken, implicit, yet widely
shared sentiment that those harmed by national security actions—a
class, recall, that is defined largely in terms of protected characteristics
such as faith or ethnicity—must simply bear the losses that fall on
them as the price of their religion or skin color.
Perhaps all this is worth the candle. Without comparative statics
of diverse counterterrorism strategies and a theory of the moral harms
from official discrimination, it is hard to reach a definitive conclusion
without recourse to one’s own normative and empirical intuitions. At
a minimum, however, the complex normative questions raised by pursuing the social production of counterterrorism should be understood
and acknowledged. To pass upon them in an ill-informed and careless fashion, as current policy risks, seems at best irresponsible.
CONCLUSION
It is conventional wisdom that in the past few decades, debates
about the appropriate roles of the state and private ordering across a
spectrum of policy issues outside the national security domain have
turned against the state and in favor of private ordering.368 Yet even
among the most ardent of Hayekians, the belief persists that the
state’s dominance over matters of public order and security is sensi365

See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86–88 (1963).
Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA), 18 U.S.C. app. § 3 (2006).
367
Indeed, measures modeled on CIPA have been adopted in some (civil) habeas proceedings. See, e.g., Al Odah v. United States, 559 F.3d 539, 544–47 (D.C. Cir. 2009); In re
Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 634 F. Supp. 2d 17, 24 (D.D.C. 2009).
368
For a brisk account, see Jennifer Schuessler, Hayek: The Back Story, N.Y. TIMES BOOK
REV., July 11, 2011, at 27.
366
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ble.369 The Prevent strategy and Empowering Local Partners destabilize
this dichotomy, introducing a set of new questions about causes,
mechanisms, and policies. Perhaps discomforted by this ideological
confusion, neither the U.S. nor the U.K. government has pursued
those policies’ underlying causal mechanisms or downstream policy
consequences.
To address these gaps, this Article has aimed to place fragile and
undertheorized claims about a social role in counterterrorism on
more secure social-scientific footing. To that end, I have posited
three specific causal mechanisms by which private behavior might
conduce to collective security, which I have labeled ideological competition, ethical anchoring, and cooperative coproduction. The first two operate
on the front end of terrorism conspiracies by making the cost of effective publicity for terrorist groups higher. The last one operates at the
back end by raising the costs of surreptitious violence. My aim in this
Article, to reiterate, has not been to referee conclusively between
these divergent concepts. Instead, by articulating a plausible causal
framework for governments’ currently diffuse and inchoate assertions
about counterterrorism’s social provenance, I hope to have provided
a more substantial basis for future policymaking in addition to something of an agenda for further empirical work.
Drawing on work outside the national security domain, I have further elaborated theoretical templates for state intervention using deterrence and legitimacy theory, and I have also identified threshold
practical and normative dilemmas. No doubt this is only a start. To
reach a deeper consensus on precisely which policies are most desirable to pursue, further empirical work, policy experimentations, and
policy reevaluations are required. Even in the interim, the analyses in
this Article suggest that advocates of a state monopoly on the production of national security should tread with care: the sources and origins of safety, it seems, are more diverse, more complex, and more
fragile than previously believed.

369
This idea might be summarized as follows: “[T]he market is efficient, and within
that space there is no need for government intervention,” whereas outside the “orderly
market,” where disorder trumps voluntary exchange, “government intervention is necessary, legitimate, and competent.” BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS:
PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 38 (2011).
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